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3776
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VETOES
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sentencing authority to focus on the specific
circumstances of the crime and the particular
characteristics of the offender to the extent
constitutionally required by the controlling Supreme
Court decisions. That Blackwell was afforded an
opportunity to present, and did present, broad
circumstances of mitigation to the jury hardly
suffices as the measure of the statute's
constitutionality; the jury was neither required nor
permitted by the statute to weigh or objectively
focus on Blackwell's character and record before
returning its verdict and causing the death sentence
to be imposed upon him."
Host illustrative of the general approach of the
United States Supreme Court is the following expression
of Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the plurality in
Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. at 2935:
"In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman
that the penalty of death not be imposed in an
arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a
carefully drafted statute that ensures that the
sentencing authority is given adequate information
and guidance. As a general proposition these
concerns are best met by a system that provides for
a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing
authority is apprised of the information relevant to
the imposition of sentence and provided with
standards to guide its use of the information.
"We do not intend to suggest that only the
above—described procedures would be permissible
under Furman or that any sentencing system
constructed along these general lines would
inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman, for each
distinct system must be examined on an individual
basis. Rather, we have embarked upon this general
exposition to make clear that it is possible to
construct capital-sentencing systems capable of
meeting Furman's constitutional concerns."
With these general principles to guide us, we now
turn to an examination of the principal features of
Senate Bill 106 and our assessment of its
constitutionality, with particular consideration of the
specific questions you have posed.
Although the Bill as passed does not mirror the
statute of any other single state, in its initial form it
largely followed the Florida sentencing procedures. The
aggravating circumstances, however, without proof of
which the death penalty may not be imposed, largely
followed the present Maryland list of capital punishment
crimes.
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