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3774
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VETOES
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Dear Governor Mandel:
Senate Bill 106, as amended and passed by the
General Assembly at the recently concluded session,
provides generally for penalties for first degree murder,
and creates a capital sentencing system applicable to
certain specifically defined types of first degree
murder. In connection with your review of this Bill you
have requested our views as to the constitutionality of
the Bill in its entirety, you have posed a number of
specific questions concerning the procedures for
imposition of the death penalty under the Bill, and you
have solicited our general comments on any aspect of the
Bill which might create significant problems in the
application of its death penalty provisions. 1
Quite obviously, in considering the
constitutionality of any capital punishment statute, we
must apply the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court
of the United States, primarily in its decisions in six
cases decided on July 2, 1976. In these cases, the
Supreme Court examined the statutes of six states
imposing the death penalty for the crime of murder, to
determine if the death penalty imposed under such
statutes constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. In these decisions, the
Supreme Court found that the imposition of a sentence of
death for the crime of first degree murder does not,
under all circumstances, constitute a cruel and unusual
punishment violative of the federal constitution.
Following this conclusion, the Supreme Court examined the
statutory capital sentencing procedures in each of the
states in question, upholding those sentencing systems
which avoided imposition of the death penalty in the
arbitrary, capricious and random manner proscribed by
Furman v. Georgia. 408 U. S. 238 (1972), and striking
down those systems which did not suitably direct, limit
and guide the sentencing body in an informed manner in
imposition of the death sentence, both as to the
particular offense as well as to the particular offender.
The capital sentencing statutes of Georgia, Texas
and Florida, all of which established a bifurcated trial
procedure in which guilt and punishment were separately
determined and provided and expedited and automatic
appellate review, were upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.
Ct. 2909 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976);
and Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976). The
death penalty statutes in each of these states limited
imposition of the death penalty to those cases in which
certain aggravating circumstances were shown and perhaps
more significantly required the sentencing authority to
consider the existence of mitigating circumstances.
These procedures, while not constituting an absolute
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