4066

VETOES

actual period of the lapse, while, in the latter case,
there would be continuing coverage. Accordingly, we find
that the title to House Bill 1650 which states that the
purpose of the enactment is to require reinstatement of
lapsed policies under certain circumstances does not
describe what the current provisions of the bill provide,
namely that the grace period for premium payments shall
be extended for the duration of those circumstances, thus
preventing any lapse at all. We advise, therefore, that
it is likely that a court would hold House Bill 16 50 to
violate the mandate set forth in Section 29 of Article
III of the Maryland Constitution which requires that:
"Every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace
but one subject... that shall be described in its
title..."

II.

In addition, we have found precedent which seriously
questions the legality of any State's attempt to prevent
the lapsing of insurance policies for the duration of a
strike by collecting agents against the insurance
companies that employ them.

In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Commissioner of Insurance, 208 N.E. 2d 516 (Mass., 1965),
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered a
Massachusetts statute quite similar to the operative
provisions of House Bill 1650 and held that such statute
was inherently incompatible with federal labor law. In
that case, the Massachusetts court pointed out that such
a statute:

"while it does not regulate any substantive
term of a labor—management agreement, gives the
union [of collecting agents] a potent weapon which
cannot fail unilaterally to restrict the desired
bilateral freedom of collective bargaining, left
free by Congress for the operation of economic
forces." 208 N.E. 2d at 524-25 (citations omitted);

and then concluded:

"for the State to intrude into such an area

designed to be kept free is as much a violation of

the Federal policy as it is for a State to attempt

to regulate rights or duties specifically protected

by the federal acts." 208 N.E. 2d at 525.

The Massachusetts court also found that such a statute

further interferred with rights specifically protected

under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended;

namely: the right of the worker to refrain from

participating in any strike [See 29 U.S.C. §157 (1958)];

and the right of an employer to replace workers who have

struck [See N.L.R.B. v Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S.