MARVIN MANDEL, Governor                       3173

is no doubt but that the character of the two counties
and of their respective surrounding areas is sufficiently
different to conceivably lead to different conclusions
about the secondary extra—territorial impact of the
respective land use prohibitions. Furthermore, whereas
Senate Bill 389 imposed a permanent prohibition, the
temporary nature of the ban imposed by House Bill 1785
would at the very least significantly lessen the extent
of any impact both within and without Anne Arundel
County. Just as we declined to make factual assumptions
in order to find Senate Bill 389 unconstitutional, we
decline to do so here under the reverse circumstances
and, accordingly, conclude that House Bill 1785 is
unconstitutional. In doing so, we must express our
underlying views with respect to Dasch v. Jackson, supra,
and the proposition that legislation which facially
applies only in one county may be deemed to constitute a
public general law on the basis of some secondary
extra—territorial effect.

In Dasch v. Jackson, supra, the Court of Appeals
concluded that a law passed by the General Assembly
establishing a board to examine the qualifications of,
and license, all persons engaging in the business of
paper—hanging in Baltimore City was not a public local
law and, therefore, was not contrary to Section 4 of
Article XI—A of the Maryland Constitution. The Court
stated the following two bases for its conclusion:

"First, because it [the bill] imposes taxes or fees
designed to produce a surplus payable into the
general funds of the State (Gaither v. Jackson,
supra) and to that extent affects to some extent the
people of the whole State. Second, because it
affects the right of persons not residing in the
City of Baltimore as well as the right of persons
residing within that city to engage in the business
of paper—hanging in Baltimore City, either as
contractors or journeymen." 170 Md. at 261.

Clearly the first factor cited in the Dasch case is
not present in House Bill 1785 since it does not purport
in any way to generate State revenues. The question thus
becomes whether a bill will be held to be a public
general law solely because it may have some secondary
effect on persons outside of the jurisdiction to which it
is applicable. We do not believe that the Dasch case can
or should be read as suggesting or dictating such a broad
result. Were this not the case, then it could be said
that virtually no conceivable piece of legislation could
constitute a public local law. We do not believe that
such a result was intended.

Since we are dealing here with legislation
purporting to affect the use of land, consider a