3146                                                      VETOES

by the master" is not a final order. The cross reference
to Section 12—701 could scarcely have the effect of
providing for a stay, but even if it should be construed
that way, it might well be thought to have a much broader
effect since the bill appears to make the order in
question not final and thus unappealable.

Be that as it may, the bill seems to present other
problems, the basic one being the assumption that a
master imposes a judgment in a juvenile case.

In Matter of Anderson, No. 491, September Term 1973
(February 11, 1974) the Court of Special Appeals made it
clear that a master may do no more than make findings and
recommendations. The master assists the judge as an
employee of the court. There is no adjudication by
reason of the master's findings and recommendations.
There is no adjudication, and no order, until a judge has
taken some specific action with respect to the master's
findings and recommendations. Maryland Rule 908.e.
reflects this theory quite clearly.

Therefore, the bill as drawn seems to be
meaningless; there would not be an "judgment imposed by
the master."

One final problem may exist. H.B. 1111 amends Title
3, subtitle 8 of the Courts Article, and does apply in
all parts of the State except Montgomery County, where
juvenile proceedings are governed by Title 3, subtitle 5.
If the bill can be construed to have the effect
apparently originally intended, that is to stay a
judgment of commitment to a training school pending
appeal, this provision would not apply in Montgomery
County. In fact, under the express language of Section
12—701(b), there is no stay of such a judgment pending an
appeal in Montgomery County. This would raise an equal
protection question, since it might appear that juveniles
in other parts of the State would be receiving more
favorable treatment pending appeal (stay of a commitment
order) than juveniles in Montgomery County. Under the
reasoning of the Court of Appeals in Matter of Trader No.
380 September Term 1973 (February 11, 1974), this might
render the Montgomery County provision unconstitutional.

Very truly yours,

/s/ William H. Adkins, II

Director