MARVIN MANDEL, Governor                                 367

handling in the jurisdictional title. The
problem arises out of Art. 26, §145(c) (1)
which gives the District Court jurisdiction
in "all actions involving landlord and
tenant, distraint, forcible entry and
detainer, and grantee suits regardless of the
amount involved"; see also §§145(c) (2) and
145(c)(3)(ii).

The clause dealing with appeals following
guilty or nolo pleas is intended to make it
clear that there is to be a full de novo
trial in such an appeal. This is the present
law; Art. 26, §30(a); see former Art. 52,
§15, repealed by Ch. 181, Acts of 1972.

SEC. 12-402. APPEALS - CONTEMPT CASES. SCOPE OF
REVIEW.

ANY PERSON MAY APPEAL FROM ANY ORDER OR JUDGMENT
PASSED TO PRESERVE THE POWER OR VINDICATE THE DIGNITY
OF THE COURT AND ADJUDGING HIM IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
THIS INCLUDES AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, REMEDIAL IN
NATURE, ADJUDGING ANY PERSON IN CONTEMPT, WHETHER OR
NOT A PARTY TO THE ACTION.

REVISOR'S NOTE: This section is based on Art. 26,
§148 (c), with language revised to follow that
of §12-304(a). Sec. 148(a) followed Art. 52,
§99 (c), now repealed. The basic contempt
power of the District Court is found in
§148 (b).

The reasons for retaining special contempt
appeal provisions are those stated in the
revisor's note following §12—304.

The ten-day appeal time is proposed for
deletion from the present law. The
limitation seems unnecessary, and has long
been deleted from Art. 5, §18. (The time
limit was five days when that section was
first adopted in 1927.) Thus, the basic
30—day appeal time will govern, as under
§12-304.

Sec. 12—403 prescribes the courts to which
appeals are taken, thus rendering unnecessary
the first sentence in the last paragraph of
§148(c). The only other changes made are in
style.