

handling in the jurisdictional title. The problem arises out of Art. 26, §145(c) (1) which gives the District Court jurisdiction in "all actions involving landlord and tenant, distraint, forcible entry and detainer, and grantee suits regardless of the amount involved"; see also §§145(c) (2) and 145(c) (3) (ii).

The clause dealing with appeals following guilty or nolo pleas is intended to make it clear that there is to be a full de novo trial in such an appeal. This is the present law; Art. 26, §30(a); see former Art. 52, §15, repealed by Ch. 181, Acts of 1972.

SEC. 12-402. APPEALS - CONTEMPT CASES. SCOPE OF REVIEW.

ANY PERSON MAY APPEAL FROM ANY ORDER OR JUDGMENT PASSED TO PRESERVE THE POWER OR VINDICATE THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT AND ADJUDGING HIM IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. THIS INCLUDES AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, REMEDIAL IN NATURE, ADJUDGING ANY PERSON IN CONTEMPT, WHETHER OR NOT A PARTY TO THE ACTION.

REVISOR'S NOTE: This section is based on Art. 26, §148(c), with language revised to follow that of §12-304(a). Sec. 148(a) followed Art. 52, §99(c), now repealed. The basic contempt power of the District Court is found in §148(b).

The reasons for retaining special contempt appeal provisions are those stated in the revisor's note following §12-304.

The ten-day appeal time is proposed for deletion from the present law. The limitation seems unnecessary, and has long been deleted from Art. 5, §18. (The time limit was five days when that section was first adopted in 1927.) Thus, the basic 30-day appeal time will govern, as under §12-304.

Sec. 12-403 prescribes the courts to which appeals are taken, thus rendering unnecessary the first sentence in the last paragraph of §148(c). The only other changes made are in style.