MARVIN MANDEL, Governor                                 125

reckless disregard for truth or falsity.
The first amendment precludes penalizing
the negligent defamor of the public
official, See New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 255 (1964).

47 USCA, §315 (Communications Act of 1934
amended in 1952) provides that if any
licensee permits a qualified candidate for
public office to use a broadcasting
station, he shall also afford equal
opportunities to all other candidates for
that office in the use of the broadcasting
station. It also provides that no licensee
of the broadcasting station has power of
censorship over material broadcast under
this provision.

In Farmers Educational and Cooperative

Union v. WDAY, Inc., 260 O.S. 525 (1958)
the Supreme Court construed the censorship
prohibition as not only being absolute, but
also that the censorship prohibition
carries with it, by necessary implication,
an absolute immunity from liability for
libelous statements broadcasted.

While §6 (a) grants a broadcasting station
immunity from liability for libelous
statements made by a candidate for public
office this immunity is limited to cases
where "the publication or utterance cannot
be censored..... "

However, it is unclear which statements
made by a person seeking a public office
can be censored.

Also it should be noted that §6(b)
specifically requires proof of actual
malice for recovery of punitive damages.
The present Maryland lav as interpreted in
Pulverman v. A.S. Abell Co., 131 F. Supp.
619 (D. Md. 1955) aff'd 228 F.2d 797 (4th
Cir. 1956) requires that malice, actual or
implied is an essential element of any
action for libel and slander. However,
§6(b) appears not to be in conflict with
this interpretation because it does not
eliminate the requisite proof of actual or
implied malice for recovery of compensatory