of the State would, we fear, be much more intent upon so
managing the Canal Company, as to produce profit to himself,
than to the Stockholders or creditors of the Company. But if
it was otherwise, there are difficulties in the way of a lease that
appear to the committee to be insuperable. The State holds a
majority of the stock of the Canal Company. This carries with
it no fee simple interest in the Canal itself. The power of the
State is of the same character with that held by any other Stock-
holders, and must be exercised in the manner provided within the
charter of the Company. In proportion to the number of snares
of stock held, the State has votes. And in a meeting of Stock-
holders, the State or its agents can vote for officers who are au-
thorised to control the Company. But these officers are not called
lessees. No such officer as a lessee is named in the charter. The
State must vote for a President and Directors. To the officers so
styled, the power to control the Company is given. And the
same charter that authorises their election, points out the mode in
which they shall exert the powers, conferred upon the Company
by their charter. Without enlarging upon the difficulties, in the
way of such a lease, growing out of the charter of the Canal
Company, we would invite attention on this subject, to the first
section of the seventh article of the Constitution of the State.
By that section of the constitution of Maryland, the Commis-
sioner of Public Works are authorised, to exercise supervision of
all public works in which the State may be interested, as stock-
holder or creditor, to represent the State in all meetings of the
Stockholders, and appoint Directors in every Railroad or Canal
Company, in which the State has power to make such appoint-
ment. It is in the same section declared to be the duty of the
Commissioners of Public Works, to use all legal power they, may
possess so to regulate the rates of tolls in the different Companies,
in which the State may hold stock, as to prevent com-
petition between such companies, injurious to the State's in-
terests.

These Commissioners of Public Works are elected by the
people in a manner pointed out in the Constitution. They derive
their powers from the Constitution. They are made independent
of the Legislature. And it is difficult to discover how the Legis-
lature could lease, the State's interest in the Canal Company
without tresspassing upon the rights of these Commissioners as
secured by the Constitution.

If this were not so, we would doubt the justice of an alienation
of the State power over the Canal Company. In all charters for
corporations the corporators have a power in the management
of the affairs of the company, in proportion to their contribution
in money to the means of the company. If in this case
the State's stock could be sold, it is is not probable that it would
be bought under a lease, or an assignment, for any sum approxi-