J. MILLARD TAWES, GOVERNOR                             1495

the ground that it "has requested that, because of its geographical
location, said State-wide policy in so far as it is implemented" by the
bill "should be inapplicable to it". In other words, since the dis-
pensaries in Montgomery County have to compete with retail liquor
stores in the District of Columbia, the State-wide policy of promoting
temperance and the orderly distribution of alcoholic beverages "as
implemented" by the bill should not apply to them.

As to the other counties excluded, there is likewise no legislative
declaration that their exclusion was prompted by their having county
dispensaries. Moreover, it should be noted that not all counties with
dispensaries have been excluded. For example, Caroline, Kent and
Dorchester Counties have liquor dispensaries (Article 2B, Sections
161 and 169), but those counties are not excluded.

In view of the exclusion of certain counties from the "state-wide
policy" of promoting temperance and the orderly sale of alcoholic
beverages "as implemented" by the proposed legislation, and the fact
that not all retail sales in the counties affected are subject to the
control imposed, the bill, if enacted, may well be held to be arbitrary
and invalid as not being even reasonably calculated to forward its
announced purpose (see Schwegmann Bros. v. Louisiana Board of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 216 La. 148). The liquor dispensaries
in the excluded counties may continue to sell alcoholic beverages at
any price which they see fit—however low. As to Montgomery County,
this low price would apply only to alcoholic beverages consumed
therein, since the exportation of such beverages therefrom into other
counties of the State is prohibited. However, this prohibition does
not apply to alcoholic beverages purchased in the other excluded
counties for consumption in counties covered by the bill.

It should also be noted that the bill does not apply to the sale of
beer, or to the sale of any alcoholic beverages by the drink in bars,
restaurants and night clubs. Moreover, a manufacturer who does
not favor fair trade may easily defeat the avowed purpose of the bill
by setting his minimum retail price at such a level as to permit the
retail package goods store to sell that manufacturer's products at
as low a price as he would have been able to do had the bill not been
passed.

In view of these factors, we feel that the Court of Appeals might
well find from the face of the bill itself what it was unable to find
in the wholesale price-posting statute (Chapter 711, Acts of 1951)
which applied on a State-wide basis—i.e., that it "could not serve its
avowed purposes". Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 201 Md. 58, 70
(1952).

Similarly, the lack of any apparent basis for the exclusion of cer-
tain counties from a State-wide regulatory policy which would appear
to be equally applicable to them may well make the bill discriminatory
legislation in violation of Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights. The
power of the Legislature to restrict the application of statutes to
localities less in extent than the entire State is not unlimited; it
"cannot be used to deprive the citizens of one part of the State of
the rights and privileges which they enjoy in common with the citi-
zens of all other parts of the State, unless there is some difference
between the conditions in the territory selected and in the conditions
in the territory not affected by the statute sufficient to afford some
basis, however slight, for classification". Maryland Coal & Realty
Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md. 627, 642 (1949).