strategy had a built-in problem. It assumed an identity
of interest between Lord Baltimore and his manor lords
that perhaps was unwarranted. The newly created lords
could easily become competitors.

   In addition to status, political power, and profits
derived from plantations in Maryland, Lord Baltimore
offered large investors the opportunity to participate in
a joint-stock trading venture. Early in the seventeenth
century men with capital customarily expected immedi-
ate, as well as long-term, returns on such high-risk
investments. It was usual to buy stock in a voyage in
anticipation of a sizeable profit as well as immediate
repayment of the capital when the ship returned.⁷ Lord
Baltimore offered those willing to make a long-term in-
vestment in Maryland the opportunity to participate in a
short-term fur trading venture. He, in turn, used the
receipts from the sale of the joint stock to purchase
goods with which to trade with the Indians for furs.⁸
Fur prices were high in England and the sale of one
cargo might easily provide immediate compensation for
the outlays made for transporting and equipping set-
tlers. Yet here, too, was a problem. If the trading ven-
ture failed—and in fact it did—both the fortunes and
the morale of all involved would suffer severely.

   Lord Baltimore not only needed investors and set-
tlers, he also needed Protestants as well as Catholics. He
planned a refuge for Catholics, but in a Protestant king-
dom an entirely Catholic colony would have been polit-
ically impossible. Nor were there sufficient numbers of
Catholics in England willing to risk their fortunes in a
wilderness. Settlers were essential, and if Lord Balti-
more was to find them, many would necessarily be Prot-
estants. But Catholics and Protestants had been in