358 State Papers and Addresses

legitimate debate and unnecessary delay. The American people have been
marvelously alert to the present crisis. They have kept abreast of swiftly-
running events. We hoped for isolation at the beginning of this war. We
came to see it as a dangerous, if not deadly, policy. From isolation we turned
to the theory of insulation. We called for a citizen army, a greater navy, a
larger armament, with all of which to seal the cracks and stop the breaches
in the walls of our defense.

The Lease-Lend Bill is part and principle of the defense plans. It serves
to strengthen our bulwarks where they are most vulnerable—that is to say,
at the present place of battle.

And we hoped for neutrality, too. That hope was shattered—but not by us.
To be neutral implies a contract, #nd a contract implies the trustworthiness
of both parties. Will anyone say that the government headed by Adolph
Hitler is trustworthy? That its treaties are binding? That its promises
are kept?

So we abandoned neutrality—in self-defense. We took moral sides with
the opponents of Hitlerism. Gradually we have come to see that England
needs—she must have—more than our moral support. We traded her some
destroyers; our factories sent over planes. We have reached the point of
understanding that this is not enough. We must become, as the President
has said, the arsenal of Democracy.

The Lease-Lend Bill is intended to make us just that. Until it passes,
England fights on in a blackout of uncertainty. Unless it passes, her own
spokesmen assert she certainly cannot win.

We know that. We can read it in the news. We have been told it by
men whose good faith we could not possibly doubt.

The issue then is very simple. Anything which speeds the Lease-Lend
Bill helps England. Anything which delays the Bill helps Hitler. Nothing
could be clearer than that.

As to whether certain modifications in the proposed Bill ought to be made
is a phase of the subject about which we need not quibble. If, without destroy-
ing the main purpose of the Bill, certain amendments should be adopted to
carry out the mandate of our Constitution, then let those amendments be made.
It can be granted that these are important details but details after all they
are. The paramount issue still demands the first attention and immediate
attention.

But it is asked—"Shall we give the President so much power?" Yes,
while it is still ours to give—and ours to have back again when^ the crisis is
past. When will, the Republic of France have such power vested in the
people? When will Holland and Belgium and Norway? It is the virtue of
our system of government to be flexible for emergency. It is the proven
wisdom of our past that responsibility in a crisis be handed to a chosen
leader. Lincoln had it and Wilson had it. President Roosevelt comes straight
from an election which gave a vote of confidence to his foreign policy. We