828 ARTICLE 23

Sec. 382 of the Code of 1904, referred to in discussing the liability of a receiver who
enters upon demised property for the rent thereof. Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md.
237 (dissenting opinion).

A statutory receiver under this section (as it appeared in the Code of 1888) ap-
pointed by a Maryland court, can resist in a District of Columbia court a suit to
prevent payment to him of a government claim at the suit of a receiver appointed
in another state claiming prior right to the fund. State comity. Phillips v. Noel Con-
struction Co., 266 Fed. (Ct. Apps. D. C.) 603.

Preferences; the insolvent law.

On the terms prescribed by sec. 377 of the Code of 1904, corporations other than rail-
road companies, upon appropriate proceedings in equity, were brought within the
operation of a provision of our insolvent system—but not under the system itself—
in so far only as respects the preference of one creditor over another, when the cor-
poration was insolvent. Apart from the insolvent laws and the terms of said sec. 377,
the mere fact that a debtor is insolvent will not prevent it from securing a pre-
existing creditor by giving the latter a priority over other creditors, if the transaction
is bona fide. How proceedings to avoid a preference must be had. Mowen v. Nitsch,
103 Md. 687. And see Murphy v. Penniman, 105 Md. 469; Hodson v. Karr, 96 Md.
479; In re Storck Lumber Co., 114 Fed. 360.

The fact that a bill which prays the appointment of a receiver and the "winding up"
of corporation does not specifically ask for a dissolution of the corporation, held
(under secs. 376 and 377 of the Code of 1904), not to deprive court of its jurisdiction
in a suit to set aside fraudulent preferences. Purposes of said sections. Payments
held preferences and set aside. Clark Co. v. Colton, 91 Md. 203 (decided in 1900).
And see dissenting opinion, page 239.

A prior decree of dissolution is essential to the maintenance of a bill by a receiver
to set aside an unlawful preference. Prior to the act of 1896, ch. 349, corporations
were not within the provisions of the insolvent law. History of this section. Hughes v.
Hall, 118 Md. 678.

As to preferences under the insolvent laws, see art. 47, secs. 8, 14 and 24.

Generally.

Under the act of 1896, ch. 349, receivers of corporations are placed on the same basis
as trustees in insolvency of natural persons, and the date of filing the bill is the time
fixed to determine the status of the parties affected by it. A depositor is entitled to
set off the amount of his deposit against the receivers of an insolvent bank. Colton v.
Drovers' Bldg. Assn., 90 Md. 93.

When a receiver has been appointed for a mortgagor corporation, the leave of the
court having jurisdiction over the receiver should be obtained before the property
is sold under the mortgage, but where such sale is reported to that court and ratified
thereby, such ratification is valid and binding. Forest Lake Cemetery v. Baker, 113
Md. 539.

The appointment of receivers under this section does not affect the lien of a mortgage
or the power of sale therein; the possession of the receivers is the possession of the
court; the receivers hold the property subject to the mortgage and may only sell
the equity of redemption save by the written consent of the mortgagee. Hence an
appeal by the mortgagee from an order appointing receivers will be dismissed; he
should apply to the court for permission to sell the property, and if the court refuses,
an appeal lies. Man'fr's & Merchants Co. v. Pyles, 125 Md. 321.

This section is a combinati9n of secs. 377, 382 and 383 of art. 23 of the Code of
1904. The vesting in the receiver is by this section made the legal consequence of a
decree of dissolution. This section referred to in construing sec. 82—see notes thereto.
Hughes v. Hall, 117 Md. 552. And see Hughes v. Hall, 118 Md. 677.

The operation of the bankrupt law held not to be defeated by a decree of dis-
solution and appointing receivers, under sec. 377 of the Code of 1904. In re Storck
Lumber Co., 114 Fed. 360.

This section referred to in construing art. 11, sec. 97. See notes thereto. Robinson v.
Hospelhorn, 169 Md. 130.

Cited but not construed in separate opinion in Hammond v. Lyon Realty Co., 163
Md. 454, 458, etc.

Cited but not construed in Standard Founders v. Oliver, 168 Md. 341.

Sec. 382 of the Code of 1904, referred to in deciding that the right of removal does
not apply to proceedings for the forfeiture of chartered franchises. Bel Air, etc., Club v.
State, 74 Md. 301.

Sec. 382 of the Code of 1904, referred to in denying the priority of the claim of the
state against an insolvent insurance company when no proceeding to enforce the claim
was taken before the receiver was appointed. State v. Williams, 101 Md. 534.

Sec. 377 of the Code of 1904, cited but not construed in Tompkins v. Sperry, etc.,
Co., 96 Md. 575.

Sec. 377 of the Code of 1904, cited but not construed in Blackistone v. State, 117
Md. 238.

See notes to secs. 93 and 97.