CONVEYANCING 729

their claims against the grantor in personam, and nothing herein contained
shall change the legal effect of the taking of possession of the property by
the grantee as provided in Section 21 of this Article. This section shall not
apply to mortgages.

This section bars creditors of grantor of deed of trust recorded after expiration of
six months unless procedure therein prescribed is followed. Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md. 233.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 23. 1912, sec. 22. 1904, sec. 22. 1888, sec. 22. 1860, ch. 133, sec. 2.

24. When any deed has been acknowledged before a commissioner ap-
pointed to take the acknowledgment of deeds out of the State, whether the
commissioner had qualified or not by taking the oath and transmitting his
signature and the impression of his seal to the .secretary of State, as required
by law, the same shall be as valid as if said commissioner had been duly
qualified and was duly authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds; and
when any commissioner to take acknowledgments of deeds out of this State
had duly qualified and was acting as such previous to the passage of the act
of eighteen hundred and fifty-two, chapter one hundred and six, and con-
tinued so to act, without having qualified as required by the said act, and
as such commissioner took the acknowledgment of any deed or mortgage,
such deed or mortgage shall be as valid as if the said commissioner had
been duly qualified to act at the time of the taking of such acknowledgment,
or doing any other official act.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 24. 1912, sec. 23. 1904, sec. 23. 1888, sec. 23. 1715, ch. 47, sec. 4.

1794, ch. 57.

25. Neither livery of seisin nor indenting shall be necessary to the
validity of any deed.

Under the acts of 1776; ch. 14, and 1715, ch. 47, the enrollment of deeds is a substi-
tute for, and equivalent to, the acts of livery. Rogers v. Sisters of Charity, 97 Md. 553;
Riley v. Carter, 76 Md. 596; Handy v. McKim, 64 Md. 569; Evans v. Horan, 52 Md.
611; Key v. Davis, 1 Md. 39; Mathews v. Ward, 10 G. & J. 448; Smith v. Steele, 3 H. &
McH. 104.

As to proof of whether a deed was indented, see Gittings v. Hall, 1 H. &• J. 14.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 25. 1912, sec. 24. 1904, sec. 24. 1888, sec. 24. 1782, ch. 23.

26! Any person seized of an estate tail, in possession, reversion or re-
mainder, in any lands, tenements or hereditaments may grant, sell and
convey the same in the same manner and by the same form of conveyance
as if he were seized of an estate in fee simple; and such conveyance shall
be good and available, to all intents and purposes, against all persons whom
the grantor might debar by any mode of common recovery, or by any ways or
means whatsoever.

Under this section, an estate in fee tail amounts to a fee simple. Tongue v. Nutwell,
13 Md. 424. And see Thomas v. Higgins, 47 Md. 452; Estep v. Mackey, 52 Md. 599;
Benson v. Linthicum, 75 Md. 144.

Where there is a judgment against a tenant in tail who subsequently sells .the
property and thus enlarges the estate under this section, the fee simple estate is not
liable to be sold for the payment of the judgment. The words "debar by any mode of
common recovery," construed. Maslin v. Thomas, 8 Gill, 18. See also Coombs v.
Jordan, 3 Bl. 299.

Under this section, a tenant in tail may defeat the estate altogether or convey only
a qualified estate. Effect of an absolute and also of a qualified conveyance. Under this
section, an estate tail cannot be devised. Laidler v. Young, 2 H. & J. 71. And see Paca v.
Forwood, 2 H. & McH. 176.

The claim of a tenant in tail, held to be barred by limitations and adverse possession.
Wickes v. Wickes, 98 Md. 318.

An estate tail special, held subject to be docked under this section. Pennington v.
Pennington, 70 Md. 436. And see Brogden v. Walker, 2 H. & J. 285; Todd v. Pratt,
1 H. & J. 465; Ridgely v. M'Laughlin, 3 H. & McH. 220.

By this section, the ancient mode of docking estates tail by common recovery is
abolished. Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G. 128; Maslin v. Thomas, 8 Gill, 18.