CHANCERY 625

passed or issued, from the time when the passing or issuing of the same
shall come to the knowledge of such person or persons, or corporation, by
service or otherwise.

. This section referred to in construing sec. 222—see note thereto. Baker v. Baker,
108 Md. 272.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 219. 1912, sec. 204. 1904, sec. 195. 1888, sec. 182. 1785, ch. 72. 1790,
ch. 60. 1816, ch. 154. 1818, chs. 133, 193. 1828, ch. 184. 1831, ch. 311. 1833, ch. 150.

225. No decree pro confesso shall be passed against an infant or insane
defendant under the preceding sections relating to process; but such infant
or insane defendant shall be proceeded against according to the provisions
of this article relating specially to infants and persons non compotes mentis.

A nominal decree "pro conjesso," held to be actually an interlocutory decree. Who
is entitled to rely upon a violation of this section? Dungan v. Vondersmith, 49 Md. 251.

As to decrees pro confesso, see sec. 170, et seq.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 220. 1912, sec. 205. 1904, sec. 196. 1888, sec. 183. 1886, ch. 334.

226. If it appear to the court, either from the pleadings or otherwise,
that there is a question of law in any case, which it would be convenient
to have decided before any evidence is given, or any question or issue of fact
is tried, the court may make an order accordingly, and may direct such
question of law to be raised for the opinion of the court, either by special
case or in such other manner as the court may deem expedient; and all such
proceedings as the decisions of such questions of law may render unneces-
sary may therefore be stayed.

An order of court answering a question raised under this section, held to be an appeal-
able order since it was in the nature of a final decree. Buckler v. Safe Deposit Co., 115
Md. 226.

Right of appeal from an order overruling plea to the whole bill filed by two of
several defendants, held not sustained by this section. No order was passed as provided
for in this section. Hall v. Hughes, 119 Md. 494.

This section followed. McEvoy v. Security Fire Ins. Co., 110 Md. 277; Murphy v.
Wheatley, 102 Md. 502; Ridgely v. Cross, 83 Md. 168. Cf. Wickes v. Wickes, 98 Md.
334; Cochrane v. Harris, 118 Md. 299; P., B. & W. R. R. Co. v. Baltimore, 121 Md. 507.

See art. 75, sec. 133.

Questions which may be heard by court in advance of main case; action of com-
plainants in asking such hearing not equivalent to demurrer or exception. Ruhl v.
Wagner, 146 Md. 601.

Trial court directed certain questions of law to be raised for opinion of court and
settled preliminarily. Robinson v. Hospelhorn, 169 Md. 122.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 221. 1912, sec. 206. 1904, sec. 197. 1888, sec. 184. Rule 45.

227. Any person interested, or claiming to be interested, in any ques-
tion cognizable by a court of equity, as to the construction of any statute,
deed, or other instrument of writing, or as to any other matter falling within
the original jurisdiction of such court, or made subject to the jurisdiction
thereof by statute, may state and raise such question before the court in
the form of a special case stated, instead of formal pleading. Every such
special case stated shall be entitled as a cause between some one or more
of the parties interested, or claiming to be interested, as plaintiff or plain-
tiffs, and the others of them as defendants; and such special case shall be
regularly docketed as a cause pending in said court, and shall be in all
respects, and for all purposes, treated and regarded as a pending cause, as
if regularly instituted by formal pleading.

Case involving an amicable controversy between a life beneficiary and remaindermen
to determine whether certain stock which was distributed was income or corpus, stated
under this section. Krug v. Mercantile Trust & Dep. Co., 133 Md. 111.

For a special case stated under this section involving the question of the right of a
mortgagor in a deed of trust to use the proceeds of certain of the trust property which