608 ARTICLE 16

being filed, such proceedings shall be had as would or might have been had
in case such answer had^: been filed before the passage of such interlocutory
order or decree; but the court shall impose such terms on the defendant as
the condition of permitting such answer to be filed, as such court may, in
its discretion, under all the circumstances of the case, judge reasonable and
proper for avoiding delay or expense, and for the attainment of justice; and
the filing of such answer shall in no case affect the validity of any testi-
mony previously taken.

This section in effect places a defendant in default in the same position as to his
right to answer, whether there be merely an interlocutory decree with authority to
proceed ex parte, or a decree pro conjesso against him. A defendant may appeal not-
withstanding a decree pro conjesso against him, and if such defendant appears and
demurs or pleads, upon appeal, the action of the court on such demurrer and pleas
will be reviewed. Turpin v. Derickson, 105 Md. 625. And as to the defendant's right
of appeal, see Long v. Long, 9 Md. 355; Lippy v. Masenheimer, 9 Md. 315.

Where a decree pro confesso is entered fifteen days after the defendant's appearance,
but testimony is taken more than two months after the entry of said decree and upon
notice to the defendant, and such testimony remained in court the required time be-
fore a final decree was passed, such decree will not be reversed on account of the irregu-
larity in entering the decree pro confesso before the expiration of twenty days from the
appearance. Bailey v. Jones, 107 Md. 405.

Action in reference to the decree pro confesso and the answer, held irregular and
not in accordance with this section—no harm done—errors waived. Wilmer v. Dunn,
133 Md. 356.

A decree pro confesso held not to deprive a defendant of the benefit of having his
testimony considered before the final decree. Benson v. Ketchum, 14 Md. 331.

This section does not mean that a defendant may never be let in to answer after
decree. Oliver v. Palmer, 11 G. & J. 149.

The last clause of this section applied. Brooke v. Perry, 2 Gill, 97.

Under the act of 1799, ch. 79, sec. 2, a defendant who had appeared and then failed
to answer, was entitled to notice before a decree pro confesso was entered (see, however,
notes to sec. 170). Wampler v. Wolfinger, 13 Md. 345.

This section referred to in deciding that a decree could be revised after enrollment
only by a bill of review, save in exceptional cases. Thurston v. Devecman, 30 Md. 218.

For a case involving the length of time which testimony and an auditor's report must
lie in court, where a defendant avails himself of the privileges conferred by this sec-
tion, see Oliver v. Palmer, 11 G. & J. 441.

After interlocutory decree of interpleader, defendant, having previously failed to
answer, has right'to appear and answer at any time before final decree. Hopkins v.
Easton Nat. Bank, 171 Md. 130.

This section construed in connection with sec. 172—see notes thereto. Belt v. Bowie,
65 Md. 353.

Cited but not construed in Wagner v. Shank, 59 Md. 327; Neale v. Hagthrop, 3 Bl.
573; Buckingham v. Peddicord, 2 Bl. 453; Fitzhugh v. McPherson, 9 G. & J. 74.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 168. 1912, sec. 153. 1904, sec. 144. 1888, sec. 131. Rule 5.

174. Every bill or petition shall be expressed in terms as brief and
concise as it reasonably can be, and shall contain no unnecessary recitals of
documents of any kind, in haec verba, or any impertinent matter, or matter
scandalous and not relevant to the suit; and the same rule shall apply to all
answers filed by defendants; and if this rule be violated, the unnecessary
or improper matter or averment may, by order of Court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, be stricken out at the cost of the party introducing
the same. The signature of a solicitor of record to any bill or other plead-
ing shall be considered as a certificate of such solicitor that he has read
the paper so signed by him, and that upon the information and instructions
laid before him regarding the case there is good ground for the same and
it is not filed for delay, or other improper purpose.¹
See notes to sec. 176.

¹ Thus amended by equity rule 5, November 21, 1919, adopted by the court of appeals
in accordance with sec. 18 of art. 4 of the Constitution.