BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES 489

An. Code, 1924, sec. 139. 1912, sec. 139. 1904, sec. 139. 1898, ch. 119. 1927, ch. 490.

139. A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged:

1. By any act which discharges the instrument;

2. By the intentional cancellation of his signature by the holder;

3. By the discharge of a prior party;

4. By a valid tender of payment made by a prior party;

5. By a release of the principal debtor, unless the holder's right of
recourse against the party secondarily liable is expressly reserved;

6. By any agreement binding upon the holder to extend the time of
payment, or to postpone the holder's right to enforce the instrument, unless
made with the assent of the party secondarily liable, or unless the right
of recourse against such party is expressly reserved.

The methods of discharge herein enumerated are exclusive of a discharge in any
other way. This applies to a surety who, however by terms of a note, is primarily
liable. Vanderford v. Farmers', etc., Bank, 105 Md. 167. And see Jamesson v. Citizens
Bank, 130 Md. 79.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 140. 1912, sec. 140. 1904, sec. 140. 1898, ch. 119.

140. Where the instrument is paid by a party secondarily liable there-
on, it is not discharged; but the party so paying it is remitted to his
former rights as regards all prior parties, and he may strike out his own
and all subsequent indorsements, and again negotiate the instrument,
except:

1. Where it is payable to the order of a third person, and has been paid
by the drawer; and,

2. Where it was made or accepted for accommodation, and has been
paid by the party accommodated.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 141. 1912, sec. 141. 1904, sec. 141. 1898, ch. 119.

141. The holder may expressly renounce his rights against any party
to the instrument, before, at, or after its maturity. An absolute and uncon-
ditional renunciation of his rights against the principal debtor made at or
after the maturity of the instrument discharges the instrument. But a
renunciation does not affect the rights of a holder in due course without
notice. A renunciation must be in writing, unless the instrument is deliv-
ered up to the person primarily liable thereon.

A renunciation under this section must be in writing; such renunciation may be
without consideration or as an accord and satisfaction. There is no such inconsistency
between this section and sec. 138 as to restrict the scope and operation of the former.
Purpose of the negotiable instruments law. Whitcomb v. Natl. Exch. Bk., 123 Md.
613. And see Jamesson v. Citizens Bank, 130 Md. 87.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 142. 1912, sec. 142. 1904, sec. 142. 1898, ch. 119.

142. A cancellation made unintentionally or under a mistake, or with-
out the authority of the holder, is inoperative; but where an instrument or
any signature thereon appears to have been cancelled the burden of proof
lies on the party who alleges that the cancellation was made unintention-
ally, or under a mistake, or without authority.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 143. 1912, see. 143. 1904, sec. 143. 1898, ch. 119.

143. Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the
assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided,¹ except as against a party
who has himself made, authorized, or assented to the alteration and subse-
quent indorsers.

¹ "Voided" evidently intended.