ATTACHMENTS 371

''Employee" includes one employed on monthly salary. Monthly allowance of fixed
amount for traveling expense is part of "wages" within this section. Shriver v. Carlin &
Fulton Co., 155 Md. 55.

Act of 1929, ch. 265, excepting judgments for food supplies for household use from
this section, is unconstitutional. Kelman v. Ryan, 163 Md. 519.

The exemption from attachment of wages granted by this section may be waived
by the employee. Lawrence v. Commercial Banking Corp., 165 Md. 559.

For exemption from execution in civil proceedings, see art. 83, sec. 8.

Where a man is paid five per cent of the cost of erecting a building for his services in
superintending the work, etc., he is an employee, and money due him comes within
the exemption of this section. Moore v. Heaney, 14 Md. 558; Wilmer v. Mann, 121
Md. 245.

Where money is in bank in the name of an insurance company for which the de-
fendant is agent, but which money is proved at the trial to belong to the agent, such
money is not exempt under this section. First National Bank v. Jaggers, 31 Md. 52.

The construction of the word "employee" as used in this section contrasted with the
construction of such word as used in art. 47, sec. 15—see notes thereto. Roberts v.
Edie, 85 Md. 186.

This section applied. Wilmer v. Epstein, 116 Md. 146.

The law prior to 1874 and the act of 1874, ch. 45, must be construed in pari materia—
the latter has no retroactive effect. Shryock v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 56 Md. 521; House v.
B. & O. R. R. Co., 48 Md. 130; Wilmer v. Mann, 121 Md. 245.

For a construction of this section prior to the act of 1886, ch. 65, see First National.
Bank v. Weckler, 52 Md. 39.

As to the assignment of wages, see art. 8, see. 11, et seq,

An. Code, 1924, sec. 34. 1912, sec. 34. 1904, sec. 34. 1888, sec. 33. 1874, ch. 230.

34. The wages or hire of any person or persons, not residing in this
State, shall be subject to attachment upon judgment, warrant or upon two
non ests, in the same manner and to no larger extent than the wages or hire
of any person or persons, resident in this State.

Judgment Pleadable by Garnishee Against Defendant.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 35. 1912, sec. 35. 1904, sec. 35. 1888, see. 34. 1715, ch. 40, secs. 3-7.

1888, ch. 401.

35. Any judgment of condemnation against a garnishee and execution
thereon, or payment by such garnishee, shall be sufficient and pleadable
in bar in any action brought against him by the defendant in the attach-
ment for or concerning the property or credits so condemned, even though
such judgment of condemnation be afterwards reversed or set aside, unless
at the time of execution made, or payment, such judgment or execution
thereon shall have been stayed according to law.

Where there is a judgment of condemnation by a competent court of the District
of Columbia (having jurisdiction), against a Maryland garnishee who pays the judg-
ment, the garnishee may plead such judgment and payment in bar of a suit here by
his creditor. Savin v. Bond, 57 Md. 228. See also Taylor v. Phelps, 1 H. & G. 502;
Williams v. Jones, 38 Md. 567. And see Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215.

The fact that a garnishee consents to a judgment impounding his debt to the prin-
cipal debtor, he being absolutely without defense, does not make the payment under
the judgment voluntary, so as to prevent him from pleading such payment in bar of
an action on the debt. Duty of the garnishee to notify the defendant. Harris v, Balk,
198 U. S. 215.

The mere pendency of the attachment is not a defense in bar—there must have been
a judgment of condemnation and execution. Cole v. Flitcraft, 47 Md. 317.

out summons or trial, waive his $100 wage exemption granted by Statute. It is the
sense of the General Assembly that the real legislative intent in the passage of this
exemption statute as amended from time to time, was to create a $100 wage exemption
which the laborer or wage earner might not waive, and it is the intent and desire
of the General Assembly by the repeal and re-enactment of this exemption statute so.
to change the wording of this statute that it clearly and unmistakably expresses the in-
tention which the General Assembly believes was sought to be expressed in the passage
of the original Act and amendments thereto. It is the sense of the General Assembly
that to permit a wage earner to waive this exemption would frequently result in de-
priving not only the wage earner, but his dependents of the necessities of life, thus ren-
dering him and such dependents a charge upon the community.