3654 ARTICLE 101

Where salesman injured by automobile on highway after separating from credit man-
ager whom he had accompanied to electric car, question as to whether injury occurred
in course of employment and arose out of it was for jury; not necessary to submit
two questions, whether injury occurred in employment and whether it arose out of it,
there being single, combined issue presenting the question sufficiently. Weston-Dodson
Co. v. Carl, 156 Md. 535.

Contractor for erection of building, with exception of electric equipment, was not
statutory employer under sec. 77 of employee of contractor for electric equipment. Long
Co. v. State Accident Fund, 156 Md. 639.

This section, together with secs. 31, 49 and other sections, indicates that employer
is primarily liable for payment of compensation and payment may be enforced in
case of insolvency of insurer. Owners' Realty Co. v. Bailey, 157 Md. 141.

Bright's disease is occupational disease and not compensable. Gunter v. Sharp &
Dohme, 159 Md. 438.

Where person employed to clean street cars at a certain car barn was killed on the
street by automobile, after working hours, as he was about to take a street car for
another car barn to get his pay, which he could get at any one of four places in the
city at such time as suited him, held that injury and death did not arise out of and in
course of his employment within meaning of this section. Miller v. United Rys. & Elec.
Co., 161 Md. 406.

"Accidental," as used in this article, may mean any fortuitous, casual and unexpected
happening which causes personal disability or death which results from some unknown
cause, etc., and a heat stroke or heat prostration may be an accident within that
definition; conditions, etc. In particular case, held that evidence justified conclusion
that employee of State Roads Commission died as result of heat prostration or sun-
stroke arising out of and in the course of his employment. 'State Roads Commission v.
Reynolds, 164 Md. 539.

On claim for death of bus driver caused by monoxide gas as result of starting motor
in employer's garage with doors and windows closed, held that evidence did not clearly
show driver's knowledge of rule of employer against starting motor under such cir-
cumstances, etc., as to require ruling that, as matter, of law, his death resulted from
"wilful misconduct" on his part. Red Star Motor Coaches v. Chatham, 163 Md. 413.

See notes to secs. 33, 44, 48, 77 and 80.

The workmen's compensation act is not in violation of either Federal or Md. Consti-
tution. Scheme of the act. The phrase "the law of the land" in Md'. Constitution means
same as "due process of law" in Federal Constitution. New York Central R. R. Co. v.
White, 243 U. S. 188, quoted and approved. The workmen's compensation commission
is not a court and is not clothed with judicial power within meaning of constitutional
provisions. Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 279; Mattare v. Cunningham, 148
Md. 313.

Where an employer is sued for a negligent injury and he desires to raise his compli-
ance with workmen's compensation law as a defense, he should file a special plea setting
up such compliance; burden is on the employer to prove that he has complied with
said law and is subject to its provisions. The law does not in terms prohibit an em-
ployer from engaging in extra-hazardous work before he has secured payment of com-
pensation as provided in this article; option of employee in such case. Constitutionality
of this article not passed on. Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 129 Md. 236.

Correct and incorrect prayers under this section and secs. 58 and 79. Intoxication is
only a defense if it is sole cause of the injury or accident resulting in injury. Recovery
under this article is without regard to negligence and contributory negligence is no
defense. American Ice Co. v. Fitzhugh, 128 Md. 390; Baltimore Dry Docks Co. v.
Webster, 139 Md. 628.

Claimant must show not only that injury was sustained in course of employment, but
also that it arose out of his employment. The meaning of "arising out of and in the
course of the employment" must be largely determined in connection with facts of
each particular case (see notes to sec. 80). Where cause of death is in dispute, a prayer
asking court sitting as jury to rule that if it found from evidence that decedent met
his death as result of a fall occasioned by vertigo or a fit, then verdict must be for
defendant, etc., properly refused, inasmuch as such prayer does not embrace a finding
that injury was caused solely by such physical disability. Cases reviewed. Balto. Dry
Docks Co. u. Webster, 139 Md. 618.

A man carrying a message relating to a supply of coal for a railroad company's use
is not engaged in interstate commerce, and hence is subject to workmen's compensa-
tion act. Cases reviewed. Hines v. Baechtel, 137 Md. 518.

As to meaning of the term "personal injury," see White v. Safe Dep. & Trust Co.,
140 Md. 600.

This section referred to in construing sec. 72—see notes thereto. Hagerstown v.
Schreiner, 135 Md. 654 (decided prior to act of 1920, ch. 456). And see Jirout v.
Gebelein, 142 Md. 698.

See notes to secs. 15, 48 and 66.

As to negligence causing death, see art. 67.