3498 ARTICLE 93

the time of the death of such person, and not an indefinite failure of his
issue, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.

This section referred to in deciding that where a will gave certain property to testa-
tor's son, his heirs, executors and assigns, but added that should his son die intestate
whether in testator's lifetime or afterwards, leaving no issue living at time of his death,
then the son's share should survive to, and vest in, certain devisees, the children of one
of these devisees, now deceased, took no interest in share of the son, who died intestate
and without issue. An executory limitation to take effect on a definite failure of issue
in first taker is valid, but a limitation to take effect on a general or indefinite failure
of issue is void. An executory devise may be limited after a fee simple, but in such
case former must be made determinable on some contingent event. See notes to sec. 342.
Bradford v. Mackenzie, 131 Md. 336.

This section applied. The words "dies without bodily heirs" are embraced within
this section—these words construed. A will held not to show a "contrary intention."
Weybright v. Powell, 86 Md. 576; Combs v. Combs, 67 Md. 16.

Except as to cases covered by this section, and unless there be words in will to ex-
plain and restrict legal import of words "dying without heirs," etc., a limitation over
on such contingency is void. Gable v. Ellender, 53 Md. 315. And see Mason v. Johnson,
47 Md. 335; Woolen v. Frick, 38 Md. 437.

This section applied; object thereof. This section distinguished from a similar English
statute. Gambrill v. Forest Grove Lodge, 66 Md. 25 (cf. the dissenting opinion in this
case). Mason v. Johnson, 47 Md. 355.

This section applied. Hutchins v. Pearce, 80 Md. 445; Lednum v. Cecil, 76 Md. 153.

This section has no retroactive operation; law prior thereto. Benson v. Linthicum,
75 Md. 144; Comegys v. Jones, 65 Md. 320; Dickson v. Satterfield, 53 Md. 322; James
v. Rowland, 52 Md. 466; Estep v. Mackey, 52 Md. 596; Woollen v. Frick, 38 Md. 437.

Prior to this section the rigidity with which rule in Shelly's case was applied elsewhere
had been relaxed somewhat in Maryland. Henderson v. Henderson, 64 Md. 191.

This section held to prevent an estate tail from arising by implication. Goldsborough
v. Martin, 41 Md. 503.

A devise over conceded not to be void for indefiniteness under this section. Lumpkin
v. Lumpkin, 108 Md. 487; Duering v. Brill, 127 Md. 109.

Cited but not construed in Pennington v. Pennington, 70 Md. 438; Carpenter v.
Boulden, 48 Md. 129.

For a similar section applicable to deeds, see art. 21, sec. 108.

An. Code, 1924. sec. 342. 1912, sec. 332A. 1912, ch. 144.

348. Whenever by any form of words in any deed, will or other instru-
ment executed after the thirty-first day of May, in the year nineteen
hundred and twelve, a remainder in real or personal property shall be
limited, mediately or immediately, to the heirs or the heirs of the body of
a person to whom a life estate in the same property is given, the persons
who on the termination of the life estate are then the heirs or heirs of the
body of such tenant for life, shall take as purchasers by virtue of the con-
tingent remainder so limited to them.

Rule in Shelley's Case applied to will probated in 1883. Effect and application of rule.
Rhodes v. Brinsfield, 151 Md. 481.

This section referred to in construing a deed under rule in Shelley's case and statute
of uses. Exception to sale sustained. Williams v. Armiger, 129 Md. 226.

This section referred to in a case dealing with rule in Shelley's case prior to adop-
tion of this section. Holmes v. Mackenzie, 118 Md. 217; Cowman v. Classen, 156 Md.
435; Wickes v. Anderson 171 Md. 584.

An. Code, 1924, see. 343. 1912, sec. 333. 1904, sec. 326. 1888, sec. 318. 1810, ch. 34, sec. 1.

1884, ch. 293.

349. No nuncupative will shall hereafter be valid in this State; but
any soldier being in actual military service, or any mariner being at sea,
may dispose of his movables, wages and personal estate as heretofore.

As to the requisites of a nuncupative will, and the law prior to act of 1884, ch. 293
see Hammett v. Shanks, 41 Md. 219; Biddle v. Biddle, 36 Md. 630; O'Neill v. Smith, 33
Md. 572; Weems v. Weems, 19 Md. 348; Welling v. Owings, 9 Gill, 470; Dorsey v.
Sheppard, 12 G. & J. 199; Brayfield v. Brayfield, 3 H. & J. 208.

Cited but not construed in Lindsay v. Wilson, 103 Md. 266.