PLEADINGS, PRACTICE AND PROCESS AT LAW 2837

equity. Conner v. Groh, 90 Md. 682. And see Whitaker v. McDaniel, 113 Md. 392;
Pearl Hominy Co. v. Linthicum, 112 Md. 32; Urner v. Sollenberger, 89 Md. 337; Taylor
v. State, 73 Md. 222; Williams v. Peters, 72 Md. 586.

The jurisdiction of equity (to restrain an action of ejectment), denied on ground that
defendant could assert under this section same matter set up by bill in equity. Park
Association v. Shartzer, 83 Md. 13; Shartzer v. Park Association, 86- Md. 337. Cf.
Williams v. Peters, 72 Md. 586; Whitaker v. McDaniel, 113 Md. 392.

A defendant in ejectment is not always precluded from going into equity after judg-
ment, because he did not interpose a plea by way of equitable defense. Sometimes
i.t is almost impossible to properly set up a claim by plea on equitable grounds so as
to do justice between parties. Stump v. Warfield, 104 Md. 552.

Cited but not construed in Crocker v. Hopps, 78 Md. 264.

As to the removal of cases from courts of law to courts of equity, and vice versa,
see sec. 124.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 92. 1912, sec. 87. 1904, sec. 87. 1888, sec. 84. 1888, ch. 547.

92. The plaintiff or the defendant in replevin may demur to such plea
for want of equity, or reply thereto facts which avoid such plea upon
equitable grounds; provided, that such replication shall begin with the
words: "For replication on equitable grounds," or words to the like effect.

Cited but not construed in Crothers v. National Bank, 158 Md. 592.

See notes to sec. 91.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 93. 1912, sec. 88. 1904, sec. 88. 1888, sec. 85. 1888, ch. 547.

93. In case it shall appear to the court that any such equitable plea
or equitable replication cannot be dealt with by a court of law so as to
do justice between the parties, it shall be lawful for such court to order
the same to be struck out on such terms as to costs and otherwise as to such
court may seem reasonable.

Cited but not construed in Crothers v. National Bank, 158 Md. 592.

Held that if plea had been technically good, the court would have been justified in
striking it out under this section. Stump v. Warfield, 104 Md. 552.

See notes to sec. 91.

Extending Judgments.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 94. 1912, sec. 89. 1904, sec. 89. 1888, sec. 86. 1794, ch. 46. 1864, ch. 175.

94. In all cases in any action on any promissory note, bill, bond or
open account in which an interlocutory judgment or judgment by default
has been or shall hereafter be entered in any of the courts of this State
whereby the right of the plaintiff is established but the damages sustained
by him are not ascertained, the judge of the court where such judgment is,
on motion of the plaintiff or of his attorney and the production to him of
the promissory note, bill of exchange, bond, record or writing obligatory
upon which the suit was brought, or upon legal and satisfactory proof of
the correctness and amount of the claim where the suit was brought to
recover a debt due upon open account, shall assess the damages and order
the judgment to be extended for the amount so found to be due, and in-
terest on the same till paid, and costs of suit. In all other cases in which
an interlocutory judgment or judgment by default has been or shall here-
after be entered, the judge of the court where such judgment is, shall, on
motion of the plaintiff or his attorney, make an order in the nature of a
writ of inquiry, to charge the jury in attendance in, such court to inquire
of the damages and costs sustained by the plaintiff in such action, which
said inquiry shall be made and the evidence given in open court in the
same manner and under the same regulations as in other jury trials; and
after the said jury, charged as aforesaid, shall have considered thereof,