LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 2471

An. Code, 1924, sec. 14. 1912, sec. 14. 1904, sec. 14. 1888, sec. 13. 1868, ch. 357.

14. In all actions where a party has a cause of action of which he has
been kept in ignorance, by the fraud of the adverse party, the right to
bring suit shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time at which such
fraud shall or with usual or ordinary diligence might have been known
or discovered.

Buyer's bill to cover payments under executed contract caused by seller's alleged
fraud, held insufficient to avoid limitations under this section. Feeser, Inc. v. American
Can Co., 2 F. Supp. 561.

This section referred to in overruling demurrer to bill to set aside, on ground of
misrepresentation and fraud, sale of stock and to require defendant to repay money
paid for such stock; setting aside conveyances. When limitations and laches begin
to run. Sears v. Barker, 155 Md. 331.

Evidence in case not sufficient to show that defendant fraudulently kept plaintiff
in ignorance of his alleged cause of action; mistaken statements do not constitute
fraud. Public Utilities Co. v. Baile, 152 Md. 374.

The suspension of the running of limitations does not apply in favor of mortgagee
seeking to recover from prior mortgagee (both mortgages being forgeries), the prior
mortgagee having acted in good faith and in no way misled subsequent mortgagee.
Bankers', etc., Assn. v. Bldg. Assn., 167 Md. 461.

Limitation on recovery by agents of unpaid part of commissions held postponed
by fraud of insurance company where facts were within its knowledge and were not
disclosed. Parr v. Ins. Co. of North America, 33 Fed. (2nd), 567.

In the event of fraud, accident or surprise, time should only run against the prejudiced
party from the acquisition or imputation of notice of the granting of the issues.
Holland v. Enright, 169 Md. 397.

Cited in construing Sec. 1 and Art. 37A, Sec. 5. Banking & Trust Co. v. Bender, 175
Md. 625.

See notes to sec. 1.

A replication is good which alleges that cause of action did occur within three
years, etc., inasmuch aa defendant fraudulently kept plaintiff in ignorance of such
cause of action by fraudulently, etc., denying that it had been guilty of acts alleged
in said cause of action and that facts did not come to knowledge of plaintiff until
within three years before suit brought, although he used ordinary diligence to dis-
cover same. Cumberland Glass Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md. 389.

Where plaintiff's attorney has notice of facts which would have put an ordinarily
prudent person on inquiry as to validity of defendant's title to land, and no examina-
tion of records or other inquiry is made, a mere statement by defendant that he
owned an outstanding title, could not be said to have fraudulently 'prevented an
investigation, and this section does not apply. Meaning of words "ordinary diligence."
Burden upon plaintiff. Case taken from jury. Purpose of this section. Wilson v.
Le Moyne, 204 Fed. 730.

Where the fraud is concealed, or is of such a character as to conceal itself, whereby
plaintiff remains in ignorance without any lack of diligence on his part, statute only
begins to run when the fraud is discovered, though there be no special effort on
part of defendant to conceal such fraud—there need be no independent fraud. Reeder
v. Lanahan, 111 Md. 384; New England Ins. Co. v. Swain, 100 Md. 572; Wear v.
Skinner, 46 Md. 264. Cf. State v. Henderson, 54 Md. 341.

Evidence held not sufficient to bring a case within this section so as to remove
the bar of the statute of limitations. Schuck v. Bramble, 122 Md. 413.

This section held to prevent the operation of the statute of limitations. Peoples v.
Ault, 128 Md. 405.

The act of 1868, ch. 357, discussed and construed. Whether plaintiff's failure to
discover cause of action was due to a failure to exercise due diligence, or to de-
fendant's concealment of his wrong, is ordinarily a question for jury. Where fraud
is committed by an agent within scope of his employment, the bar of statute is re-
moved as against the principal. New England Ins. Co. v. Swain, 100 Md. 572.

A plaintiff held not to have used ordinary diligence so as to entitle it to the bene-
fit of this section. Stieff Co. v. Ullrich, 110 Md. 634.

Knowledge, or want of diligence on the part of trustees, imputed to plaintiff. Reeder
v. Lanahan, 111 Md. 384.

For a discussion of this subject prior to the adoption of this section, see MacDowell
v. Goldsmith, 2 Md. Ch. 390.

As to extension by fraud of time within which appeal may be entered, see art. 5,
sec. 36.

See notes to art. 45, sec. 1.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 15. 1912, sec. 15. 1906, ch. 803,

15. Whenever land or lands shall be sold for the payment of county or
State taxes, or both, assessed thereon and in default, and the owner or