2468 ARTICLE 57

his writ, the action should be instituted within the statutory period. What amounts
to requisite "presence within the state"? Hysinger v. Baltzell, 3 G. & J. 161.

This section has no application to a case where there is no fraud or concealment of
residence. The object of this section discussed. Fink v. Zepp, 76 Md. 185; Maurice v.
Worden, 52 Md. 294.

The court seems to have placed very little reliance upon this section, declaring it
to be so ambiguous as to be practically useless. Mason v. Union Mills Co., 81 Md.
457; Maurice v. Worden, 52 Md. 294.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 5. 1912, sec. 5. 1904, sec. 5. 1888, sec. 5. 1765, ch. 12.

5. If any person liable to any action shall be absent out of the State
at the time when the cause of action may arise or accrue against him he
shall have no benefit of the limitation herein contained if the person who
has the cause of action shall commence the same after the presence in this
State of the person liable thereto within the terms herein limited.

Action by Md. corporation in New York barred under provisions of Md. law, as
New York statute provided that statute of state where cause of action arose should
govern. Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 24 F. Supp. 1018.

This section applied in Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603.

Where both plaintiff and defendant are non-residents and cause of action is made
and to be performed in another state, the plaintiff is entitled to benefit of this section.
Where non-resident defendant voluntarily appears in an attachment, he cannot rely
upon limitations, although plaintiff is also a non-resident, unless defendant has been
within this state for statutory period. Mason v. Union Mills Co., 81 Md. 448.

This section is to be construed in connection with sec. 1, so that intent of legisla-
ture to effect that limitations should not apply to a creditor whose debtor is out of
the state may prevail. Mason v. Union Mills Co., 81 Md. 457; Hysinger v. Baltzell,
3 G. & J. 161.

Though a defendant may be actually within limits of state, if he is beyond reach of
process, he is "out of the state" within meaning of this section. If he can be reached
by process, it makes no difference whether he is a resident or not. Mason v. Union
Mills Co., 81 Md. 457. See also Maurice v. Worden, 52 Md. 291; Hysinger v. Baltzell,
3 G. & J. 162.

When statute once begins to run, no subsequent disability will arrest it unless so
provided by statute. The effect of statute cannot be avoided by a calculation to
effect that defendant has not been in state precisely three years. Maurice v. Worden,
52 Md. 294.

Fact that defendant is a non-resident does not deprive him of benefit of statute
if he has been in Maryland for more than three years before suit brought. White v.
White, 1 Md. Ch. 57; Mason v. Union Mills Co., 81 Md. 452. Cf. Bond v. Jay, 7
Cranch. 350.

Notwithstanding this section, a suit for negligence causing death must be brought
within one year after death of deceased, in accordance with art. 67, sec. 2; and this
is true although defendant may not have been suable in Maryland during the year.
Swanspn v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 156 Fed. 977.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 6. 1912, sec. 6. 1904, sec. 6. 1888, sec. 6. 1729, ch. 25, secs. 3, 4.
1818, ch. 216. 1853, ch. 132. 1894, ch. 661.

6. All actions on sheriffs', coroners' and constables' bonds shall be
brought within five years after the date of such bonds and not afterwards;
but the State may sue on said bonds for her own use at any time; and if
any person entitled to suit on a sheriff's, coroner's or constable's bond shall
be at the time of the accruing of any cause of action on such bond under
the age of twenty-one years or non compos mentis, he or she shall be at
liberty to bring his or her action within five years after the removal of such

disability.

The act of 1818, ch. 216, repealed the saving clause in so far as it applied to persons
"beyond the seas." The court construed act of 1818 to give such persons three years
from time of passage of act to bring suit. Garrison v. Hill, 81 Md. 558. See also
Mason v. Union Mills Co., 81 Md. 450; Frey v. Kirk, 4 G. & J. 521. (As to persons
under disability, see notes to sec. 2.)

The act of 1853, ch. 132, reducing time within which suit on a sheriff's bond must
be brought, held to be constitutional as applied to bonds executed prior to its adoption.
Suit on such a bond must be brought within the five years. State v. Jones, 21 Md. 436.

A suit by Lord Proprietary on sheriff's bond for public money, held to be barred
under act of 1729, ch. 25. Lord Proprietary v. Bond, 1 H. & McH. 210.