1990 ARTICLE 45

Where a devisee dies before testator, devisee's husband is not entitled to dower
in land devised, by terms of this section alone. He is so entitled, however, in view
of art. 93, sec. 340. The terms property held "at any time during the marriage" and
"whether held by her at the time of her death or not," limited and discussed. Vogel v.
Turnt, 110 Md. 201.

This section has no retroactive effect to impair existing property rights, and hence
does not, and could not constitutionally, apply where marriage occurred and property
was acquired prior to its adoption. In such case husband's rights are not governed
by this section, and his creditors cannot proceed as though they were. Harris v.
Whiteley, 98 Md. 441. See also Slingluff v. Hubner, 101 Md. 657; Safe Deposit Co: v.
Gittings, 103 Md. 495; Jeavons v. Pittman, 126 Md. 652; Beinbrink v. Fox, 121 Md. 112.

Words "property belonging" to a married woman include a vested remainder. Secs.
1 and 2 of Code of 1860, relative to life estate of a husband in his deceased wife's
property, construed and applied. When the latter law is applicable. Snyder v. Jones,
99 Md. 696.

It was not until art. 3, sec. 38, of Constitution of 1851, and art. 45, sec. 2, of Code
of 1860, that common law rule by which a surviving husband was entitled, without
administration, to all chattels real of his wife, was altered. Hence, an equitable leasehold
interest vested in wife in 1838 passed to husband absolutely. Abell v. Firemen's Ins.
Co., 93 Md. 600.

For cases arising under art. 45, sec. 2, of the Codes of 1860 and 1888, see Schaub v.
Griffin, 84 Md. 563; Engel v. State, use of Geiger, 65 Md. 546; Willis v. Jones, 57
Md. 366; Frostburg Bldg. Assn. v. Hamill, 55 Md. 315; Brown v. Bokee, 53 Md. 163;
Frazier v. White, 49 Md. 7; Mason v. Johnson, 47 Md. 357 (deciding that husband's
curtesy did not exist with reference to property held under sec. 2); Willis v. Jones,
42 Md. 423; Herbert v. Gray, 38 Md. 536 (dissenting opinion); Hubbard v. Barcus,
38 Md. 180; Krone v. Linville, 31 Md. 145; Meyer v. Eisler, 29 Md. 34; Stockett v.
Bird, 18 Md. 488; McKee v. McKee, 17 Md; 360 (involving also law prior to 1860);
Beinbrink v. Fox, 121 Md. 112.

For cases involving act of 1841, ch. 161 (suspending execution against husband's
curtesy during wife's life), see Jordan v. Reynolds, 105 Md. 296; Logan v. McGill, 8
Md. 469.

See sec. 6 and notes, and art. 46, secs. 1-4 and notes.

As to an assignment of husband's dower, see art. 46, sec. 33, et seq.

See art. 93, sec. 313, et seq.

Cited but not construed in Hillwood v. Hillwood, 159 Md. 174.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 8. 1912, sec. 8. 1904, sec. 8. 1888, sec. 8. 1862, ch. 9.
1868, ch. 471, sec. 101. 1898, ch. 457, sec. 8.

8. Any married woman by herself and in her name or in the name of
any third person with his assent as her trustee may insure or cause to be
insured for her sole use the life of her husband for any definite period or
for the term of his natural life; and any husband may cause his own life to
be insured for the sole use^: of his wife and may also assign any policy of
insurance upon his own life to his wife for her sole use; and in case of
the wife surviving her husband, the sum or net amount of such insurance
becoming due and payable by the terms of the insurance shall be payable
to her for her own use, free from the claims of the representatives of her
husband, or any of his creditors.

This and the following section do not, under Bankruptcy Act, exempt cash surrender
value of bankrupt's insurance policies to which trustees were entitled, where bankrupt
reserves right to change beneficiary. In re Cooper's Estate, 28 F. (2nd), (Dist. Ct.
Md.), 438.

A life insurance policy payable to wife of the insured, but reserving in him the
power to change the beneficiary without wife's consent, is not exempt from creditors
under this or following section. In re Jones, 249 Fed. (D; Ct. Md.) 487. And see In re
Cooper's Estate, 28F (2d) (Dist. Ct; Md.) 438.

An assignment by husband and wife of insurance payable to the wife may be made
notwithstanding this section. Emerick v. Coakley, 35 Md. 190.

This section in connection with sec. 9, makes it clear that a voluntary assignment
of a policy by a man to his wife or children, is free from all claims of creditors.
Earnshaw v. Stewart, 64 Md. 514.

Purpose of this section. Its application is not restricted to husbands who are able
to pay their debts. Elliott v. Bryan, 64 Md. 370.

A married woman may sue in her own name for insurance under this section.
Contract for insurance held to have been made with husband and wife. Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Stibbe, 46 Md. 312.