1986 ARTICLE 45

v. Murray, 32 Md. 16; Krone v. Linville, 31 Md. 145; Buchanan v. Turner, 26 Md. 6;
Weems v. Weems, 19 Md. 344; Lawes v. Lumpkin, 18 Md. 340; Unger v. Price, 9 Md.
557; Beinbrink v. Fox, 121 Md. 112.

As to how a wife's separate estate was created prior to the Code of 1860, see Brandt
v. Mickle, 28 Md. 449; Hutchins v. Dixon, 11 Md. 37; Taggart v. Boldin, 10 Md. 117;
Turton v. Turton, 6 Md. 376; Carroll v. Lee, 3 G. & J. 504.

For case involving authority of married woman to dispose of personal property
held to her separate use prior to Code of 1860, see Chew v. Beall, 13 Md. 359.

A separate estate in the wife in personal property was unknown to the common
law. Carroll v. Lee, 3 G. & J. 504.

Married women under age.

For a mortgage by a married woman under age, held invalid, see Cronise v. Clark,
4 Md. Ch. 404. As to contracts by a female infant in contemplation of marriage, see
Levering v. Heighe, 3 Md. Ch. 370; Levering v. Heighe, 2 Md. Ch. 81.

Prior to act of 1888, ch. 329 (see sec. 12), a married woman under age could not
relinquish her dower by uniting in a mortgage. Glenn v. Clark, 53 Md. 603.

As to a conveyance of dower by a married woman under age, see sec. 12.

As to the power of married women between eighteen and twenty-one years of age,
to make a deed of trust, see art. 21, sec. 1.

Generally.

Fact that wife held property as part of her sole and separate estate during life time,
both under deed and under this section, did not bar husband's right to his statutory
share of her estate. See notes to art. 93, sec. 330. Jaworski v. Wisniewski, 149 Md. 115.

A deed by a married woman not in conformity to the law at time it is executed,
is void. Gebb v. Rose, 40 Md. 387; Preston v. Fryer, 38 Md. 225.

The provisions of secs. 1 and 2 of art. 45 of the Code of 1860, authorizing married
women to acquire and hold property, do not affect nature of estate conveyed by a
deed to them jointly. Fladung v. Rose, 58 Md. 21; Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 412.

For cases arising under sec. 11 of the Code of 1860 (relating to the right of a married
woman to convey her property jointly with her husband), see Armstrong v. Kerns,
61 Md. 366; Greenholtz v. Haeffer, 53 Md. 186; Whitridge v. Barry, 42 Md. 152;
Gebb v. Rose, 40 Md. 392; Emerick v. Coakley, 35 Md. 191.

For case discussing art. 45, sec. 2, of Code of I860, with reference to whether our
insolvent laws extended to married women (prior to art. 47, sec. 37), see Relief Bldg.
Assn. v. Schmidt, 55 Md. 100.

For case involving the execution by a married woman, of a power, see Schley v.
McCeney, 36 Md. 266.

Cited but not construed in Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 223 (art. 45, sec. 2, Code of 1860);
Allers v. Forbes, 59 Md. 376 (art. 45, sec. 2, Code of 1888); Vogel v. Turnt, 110 Md. 198.

See notes to secs. 1 and 7.

An. Code, 1924, see. 5. 1912, sec. 5. 1904, sec. 5. 1898, ch. 457, sec. 5.

5. Married women shall have power to engage in any business, and to
contract, whether engaged in business or not, and to sue upon their con-
tracts, and also to sue for the recovery, security or protection of their
property, and for torts committed against them, as fully as if they were
unmarried; contracts may also be made with them, and they may also be
sued separately upon their contracts, whether made before or during mar-
riage, and for wrongs independent of contract committed by them before or
during their marriage, as fully as if they were unmarried; and upon judg-
ments recovered against them, execution may be issued as if they were
unmarried; nor shall any husband be liable upon any contract made by his
wife in her own name and upon her own responsibility, nor for any tort
committed separately by her out of his presence, without his participation
or sanction.

Contracts by married women.

The husband is not liable for debts contracted upon wife's sole credit. Farver v.
Pickett, 162 Md. 12.

Cited in dissenting opinion in Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 500.

Prior to act of 1898, all of a married woman's contracts, agreements and covenants
were void except as to her separate estate. Where (prior to said act) a wife joined
with her husband in a deed for purpose of barring her dower, she is not liable on
the covenants of a general warranty in deed. Pyle v. Gross, 92 Md. 133. And see
Lyell v. Walbach, 113 Md. 577; Six v. Shaner, 26 Md. 444.