CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 1097

An assault with intent to rob, murder or rape is not a felony in Maryland; in this
state only those crimes are felonies which were such at common law or have been so
declared by statute. The death penalty provided by this section is not in violation of
arts. 16 or 25 of the Declaration of Rights. Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 375.

The allegation that an act was done with intent "feloniously" to rob does not vitiate
an indictment under this section. To constitute the crimes of robbery, murder or rape,
felonious act and felonious intent must concur. To bring an assault under this section
the act must be charged and proved to have been committed with an intent to commit
a crime which is a felony. The omission of the allegation of violence from indictment
is immaterial; it is sufficient to state with precision facts requisite to constitute an
assault and battery, and to aver the intent. Hollohan v. State, 32 Md. 399 (decided
prior to act, 1904, ch. 76).

A count charging rape may be united with one charging assault with intent to rape;
a felony and a misdemeanor may be joined in the same indictment. A verdict which
is a nullity is a mere mistrial; prisoner should not be discharged, but a new trial
ordered. State v. Sutton, 4 Gill, 494 (decided prior to act, 1904, ch. 76).

Where an indictment charges the same offense in various forms, prosecutor cannot
be required to elect between them; contra, if indictment charges distinct offenses. State
v. Bell, 27 Md. 675 (decided prior to act, 1904, ch. 76). Cf. Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135.

The instrument or means made use of in the assault, etc., need not be stated in the
indictment; it is sufficient to follow the language of the statute. State v. Dent, 3 G. & J.
8 (decided prior to act, 1904, ch. 76).

Where an indictment contains two counts, one charging assault with intent to kill
and the other a simple assault and battery, a general verdict of "guilty" is sufficient
and a judgment for the higher offense is proper. Manly v. State, 7 Md. 148 (decided
prior to act, 1904, ch. 76). Cf. State v, Sutton, 4 Gill, 494.

An objection to an indictment under this section on ground that it did not state
that the intent was felonious and of malice aforethought. Lewis v. State, 32 Md. xii
(decided prior to act, 1904, ch. 76).

Admissibility of evidence in a prosecution under this section. Consent is not an
element of the offense. Rau v. State, 133 Md. 614.

Barratry.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 18. 1912, sec. 18. 1908, ch. 413.

14. Whoever, for his own gain, and having no existing relationship or
interest in the issue, directly or indirectly, solicits another to sue at law
or in equity, or to make a litigious claim, or to retain his own or another's
services in so suing or making a litigious claim; or whoever knowingly
prosecutes a case in which his services have been retained as a result of
such solicitation; or causes any case to be instituted without authority;
or whoever, being an attorney at law, directly or indirectly, agrees to pro-
cure another to be employed as an expert witness, or otherwise, or pro-
cures another to be so employed in consideration of his so soliciting litigious
business or undertaking to solicit it, or in any other way compensates or
agrees to compensate another for so doing shall, upon conviction thereof,
be punished by a fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment in jail
for not more than three months, or by both. Any solicitation as aforesaid
shall be prima facie evidence that the person so soliciting is doing so for
gain. The term attorney at law shall include counsellor at law; provided
that nothing herein contained shall impair or affect the disciplinary powers
of the courts of this State over attorneys and counsellors at law appearing
and practicing in the same.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 19. 1912, sec. 18A. 1916, ch. 695.

15. It shall be unlaAvful for any corporation or voluntary association
to assume, use or advertise in any newspaper, periodical, or by use of any
notice, circular, letterhead, card, or in any manner whatsoever, the title of
lawyer, or attorney, attorney at law, or equivalent terms in any language in
any such manner as to convey the impression that either alone or together
with, or by, or through any person, whether a duly and regularly admitted