CHANCERY. 525

unknown and if there be no heirs the State's Attorney shall appear to the
bill.

Title of purchasers.

A purchaser of a decedent's real estate, is charged with knowledge of such de-
cedent's debts and if the personalty is insufficient to pay them, he takes title sub-
ject to the creditor's rights under this section. Gibson v. McCormick, 10 G. & J.
65; Green v. Early, 39 Md. 231; Van Bibber v. Reese, 71 Md. 617.

After a final settlement of a decedent's personal estate in the orphans' court
showing the payment of debts, the costs of administration and a balance on hand,
a bona fide purchaser of real estate without notice of debts still due by the estate,
gets a clear title. Van Bibbler v. Reese, 71 -Md. 611.

No application.

In order that the court may have jurisdiction under this section, there must be
a debt due by the decedent in his lifetime. This section has no application where
a bill is filed against the heirs and devisees of a non-resident for damages arising
out of a refusal to comply with an option given the plaintiff by the decedent in his
lifetime and closed by the plaintiff subsequent to the decedent's death. McGaw v.
Gorter, 96 Md. 492. And see Carey v. Dennis, 13 Md. 15.

This section can have no operation upon real estate located outside of Mary-
land. Seldner v. Katz, 96 Md. 219.

Generally.

Before the real estate can be sold for the payment of debts, it must be alleged
and proved that the personalty is insufficient. Van Bibber v. Reese, 71 Md. 611;
Hardesty v. Hardesty, 77 Md. 189; Warfield v. Owens, 4 Gill, 383; Baltzell v. Foss,
1 H. & G. 506; Wyse v. Smith, 4 G. & J. 302 (overruling Tessier v. Wyse, 3 Bl.
28); Griffith v. Frederick Bank, 6 G. & J. 445; Bank of United States v. Ritchie,
8 Pet. 143.

It is not necessary that a creditor's bill under this section should provide for the
coming in of other creditors. Unnecessary allegations and procedure. Bill suffi-
cient. Contribution and substitution. Gibson v. McCormick, 10 G. & J. 65. And
see Robertson v. Parks, 3 Md. Ch. 69; Ridgely v. Bond, 18 Md. 450.

The executor of the debtor should be made a party defendant to a creditor's bill .
under this section. David v. Grahame, 2 H. & G. 97; Tyler v. Bowie, 4 H. &
J. 333. And see McLaughlin v. McGee, 131 Md. 163.

This section does not entitle a general unsecured creditor of a deceased mort-
gagor to redeem the mortgage and be subrogated to rights of mortgagee. Quasi
lien arising out of this section. McNiece v. Eliason, 78 Md. 176.

This section and sec. 234 referred to in deciding that creditors of deceased per-
sons may have their claims passed in the orphans' court without being barred
from filing a bill in equity in case there is an insufficiency of assets; estoppel not
made out. Creditor may proceed against a surplus in the hands of a trustee in a
mortgage foreclosure case. When personal representative should be a party. Mc-
Laughlin v. McGee, 131 Md. 161.

This section and sec. 243 referred to in construing art. 93, sec. 340. Executors
held to have no power under a will to sell real estate for the payment of legacies.
St. John's Church v. Dippoldsman, 118 Md. 247.

By bill of reviver after a decree for an account, a widow and heirs of a deceased
defendant may be made parties, and by an allegation of the insufficiency of the per-
sonal estate to pay debts, the bill may be given the attributes of a creditor's bill
under this section. Glenn v. Smith, 17 Md. 282.

A decree for sale under this section, establishes the debt and the insufficiency of
the personal estate. Griffith v. Reizart, 6 Gill, 453; Post v. Mackall, 3 Bl. 486.

The rents and profits of lands in the hands of the heir, may also be subjected to
the intestate's debts. Scott v. Scott, 17 Md. 91.

This section places infants and adults- on the same basis, and hence an infant
reaching his majority after a decree is passed cannot then object. Tessier v.
Wyse, 3 Bl. 62. And see Campbell's Case, 2 Bl. 224; Watkins v. Worthington, 2
Bl. 521; Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bl. 352.

The proceeding against the administrator relative to the personal property, and
that against the heir relative to the real estate, are entirely independent of each