CHANCERY. 503

be special interrogatories appended to the bill to be answered by the de-
fendants, or some of them, in which cases there shall be a prayer that the
defendant or defendants be required to answer the bill, or the special inter-
rogatories appended thereto under oath.

This section recognizes the principle that every bill in equity must contain a
clear statement of the facts upon which the plaintiff relies for relief; requisites of
bill for specific performance and for injunction. McDowell v. Biddison, 120 Md.
125; Chesapeake Beach Co. v. Hall, 121 Md. 654.

Where the paragraphs of a bill are misnumbered, and more than one subject
matter injected into a single paragraph, such defects should be taken advantage
of by motion in the nature of a ne recipiatur, and not by demurrer. This section
will be construed so as to exact a reasonable compliance with its requirements.
Chew v. Glenn, 82 Md. 374.

See notes to sec. 169.

An. Code, sec. 156. 1904, sec. 147. 1888, sec. 134. Rule 8.

171. The prayer for process, or for order of publication, shall contain
the names of all the defendants named in the introductory part of the bill
or petition, and the place of their residence, as far as known; and if any
of said defendants are know:n to be infants under age, or under any other
disability, such fact shall be stated, so that the court may take order thereon,
as justice may require. And if an injunction, or other writ, or any special
order be asked in the prayer for relief, that shall be sufficient, without
repeating the same in the prayer for process.

The last sentence of this section does not prevent the court from referring to
the special prayer for a preliminary injunction, in order to ascertain the extent
of such injunction. Consol. Gas Co. v. Baltimore County, 98 Md. 694.

The prayer for process in an amended bill held to be in conformity with this
section; the original bill contained the name and address of the then sole defendant
and thus gave all the information that would have been given if such name and
address had been repeated in the prayer for process. Longley v. McGeoch, 115
Md. 186.

See notes to sec. 37.

An. Code, sec. 157. 1904, sec. 148. 1888, sec. 135.

172. At any time before the bill is taken pro confesso, or afterwards
(before final decree), by the special leave of the court or judge thereof,
the defendant may answer, plead or demur to the bill; and he may plead
or demur to the whole bill, or to part thereof, and he may demur to part,
plead to part, and answer as to the residue; but in every case in which the
bill specially charges fraud, usury or combination, a plea to such part must
be accompanied with an answer supporting the plea, and explicitly denying
the fraud, usury or combination, and the facts on which the charge is
founded.

A defendant should assign some satisfactory reason for the delay, and the peti-
tion should be verified by oath, but the sufficiency of the reasons are not review-
able by the court of appeals, nor the terms upon which the defendant is allowed
to answer, such matters being within the discretion of the lower court. Decree
rescinded and replication filed after a bill has been dismissed for failure to file it.
Petition by a party in default not sworn to and in the names of the solicitors in-
stead of the plaintiffs, does not justify the court of appeals in reviewing action of
lower court. Norris v. Ahles, 115 Md. 67.

A contention that the action of the lower court was irregular in directing that
the denial of the fraud alleged in the bill, by which the defendants supported
their plea as required by this section, should stand for an answer, held premature
even if such question were not within the discretion of the trial court. Wilmer v.
Placide, 128 Md. 172.