CHANCERY. 501

An. Code, sec. 151. 1904, see. 142. 1888, sec. 129. 1799, ch. 79, sec. 5.

166. If any defendant, after appearance and before he puts in a suffi-
cient answer, shall leave the State, or if any non-resident defendant appears
and does not put in a sufficient answer, the court may order such defendant
to answer by a particular day, and upon his failure to comply with such
order, the bill may be taken pro confesso against such defendant.

An. Code, sec. 152. 1904, sec. 143. 1888, sec. 130. 1795, ch. 88, sec. 1.
1797, ch. 114, sec. 3. 1799, ch. 79, sec. 2. 1820, ch. 161, sec. 3.

167. Any defendant against whom an interlocutory decree shall be
entered, and also any defendant against whom an order to take a bill as to
any matter or thing pro confesso may be passed, may appear at any time
before final decree and file his answer, on oath, to the bill, which shall be
filed forthwith, or within such reasonable time as the court in its discretion,
and on special cause shown by affidavit, shall appoint; and on such answer
being filed, such proceedings shall be had as would or might have been had
in case such answer had been filed before the passage of such interlocutory
order or decree; but the court shall impose such terms on the defendant as
the condition of permitting such answer to be filed, as such court may, in
its discretion, under all the circumstances of the case, judge reasonable and
proper for avoiding delay or expense, and for the attainment of justice; and
the filing of such answer shall in no case affect the validity of any testi-
mony previously taken.

This section in effect places a defendant in default in the same position as to
his right to answer, whether there be merely an interlocutory decree with au-
thority to proceed ex -parte, or a decree pro confesso against him. A defendant
may appeal notwithstanding a decree pro confesso against him, and if such de-
fendant appears and demurs or pleads, upon appeal, the action of the court on
such demurrer and pleas will be reviewed. Turpin v. Derickson, 105 Md. 625.
And as to the defendant's right of appeal, see Long v. Long, 9 Md. 355; Lippy
v. Masonheimer, 9 Md. 315.

Where a decree pro confesso is entered fifteen days after the defendant's ap-
pearance, but testimony is taken more than two months after the entry of said
decree and upon notice to the defendant, and such testimony remained in court
the required time before a final decree was passed, such decree will not be re-
versed on account of the irregularity in entering the decree pro confesso before
the expiration of twenty days from the appearance. Bailey v. Jones, 107 Md. 405.
Action in reference to the decree pro confesso and the answer, held irregular
and not in accordance with this section—no harm done—errors waived. Wilmer
v. Dunn, 133 Md. 356.

A decree pro confesso held not to deprive a defendant of the benefit of having
his testimony considered before the final decree. Benson v. Ketchum, 14 Md. 331.
This section does not mean that a defendant may never be let in to answer
after decree. Oliver v. Palmer, 11 G. & J. 149.

The last clause of this section applied. Brooke v. Perry, 2 Gill, 97.
Under the act of 1799, ch. 79, sec. 2, a defendant who had appeared and then
failed to answer, was entitled to notice before a decree pro confesso was en-
tered (see, however, notes to sec. 164). Wampler v. Wolfinger, 13 Md. 345.

This section referred to in deciding that a decree could be revised after en-
rollment only by a bill of review, save in exceptional cases. Thurston v. Devec-
man, 30 Md. 218.

For a case involving the length of time which testimony and an auditor's report
must lie in court, where a defendant avails himself of the privileges conferred
by this section, see Oliver v. Palmer, 11 G. & J. 441.

This section construed in connection with sec. 172—see notes thereto. Belt v.
Bowie, 65 Md. 353.

Cited but not construed in Wagner v. Shank, 59 Md. 327; Neale v. Hagthrop,
3 Bl. 573; Buckingham v. Peddicord, 2 Bl. 453; Fitzhugh v. McPherson, 9 G. &
J. 74.