50 CONSTITUTION OF MARYLAND.

the state may tax either the capital stock or the real and personal property of a
corporation, it cannot tax both, and there must be no discrimination as between
different species of property. State v. C. & P. R. R. Co., 40 Md. 49 (cf. dissenting
opinions, page 62, et seq. ). And see Maxwell v. State, 40 Md. 294. Cf. State v.
Applegarth, 81 Md. 302; Rohr v. Gray, 80 Md. 277.

A tax imposed on collateral inheritances—see art. 81, sec. 124, et seq., of the An.
Code—held not to violate this article. History of this article. Tyson v. State, 28
Md. 586.

The state may tax the amusements of the people either for revenue or as a police
regulation, and the courts have nothing to do with the judicious exercise of this
power. Germania v. State, 7 Md. 8.

A tax to be used for deporting negroes, held not to violate this article. In the
absence of evidence that persons taxable were not to contribute according to their
actual worth, etc., the presumption is that the tax is constitutional. The foregoing
tax held not to have been laid for the support of the government, but with a politi-
cal view for the good government and benefit of the community. Waters v. State,
1 Gill, 308.

The act of 1918, ch. 122, creating a sanitary district, or a special taxing district,
within two counties, held constitutional and valid. Dahler v. Wash. Sub. San. Com.,
133 Md. 647.

Corporate taxation.

All taxes levied upon property should be equal and uniform according to its
actual value; one person should not be taxed at one rate and another person at
another rate; -beyond this it was not the purpose of the Constitution to limit tax-
ation. A tax upon the gross receipts of railroad companies, in lieu of all other
taxes, is valid; it is not a direct tax upon property, but upon the franchises of rail-
road companies, measured by the extent of their business. There is a wide distinc-
tion between a tax upon the franchises of a corporation and a tax on its property.
Nature of " franchises "; they are not property as that term is used in this article.
State v. P., W. & B. R. Co., 45 Md. 376 (cf, dissenting opinion). And see State v.
Applegarth, 81 Md. 302; Rohr v. Gray, 80 Md. 277.

The gross receipts earned in this state and derived from properties and invest-
ments held and owned by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company under fran-
chises granted subsequent to its charter and upon which no exemption from taxation
was engrafted, held taxable. Where franchises of a corporation are exempt from
taxation, the gross receipts derived from the exercise of such franchises are also
exempt. State v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 48 Md. 80 (cf. concurring and dissenting opin-
ions). And see State v. Northern Central Ry., 40 Md. 169.

The act of 1872, ch. 234, taxing the gross receipts of certain corporations, held
to be valid, since there was nothing to show that such tax was unequal or unjust
or that it subjected the property of the appellee to taxation not equally borne by
other property in the state. State v. Northern Central Ry., 44 Md. 169 (cf., dis-
senting opinion). And see State v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 48 Md. 80.

Under this article, it is the duty of the state tax commissioner in fixing the taxable
value of shares of stock to pursue a method which results in the ascertainment of
the actual value of such shares; how such value is to be determined—see notes to
art. 81, secs. 166, 166A, and 170, of the An. Code. Schley v. Montgomery County,
106 Md. 410.

Art. 81, sec. 166, et seq., of the An. Code, taxing shares of stock in a Maryland
corporation held and owned by a non-resident of this state, held not to violate this
article—see notes to art. 81, secs. 166 and 170. Corry v. Baltimore, 96 Md. 320
(affirmed in 196 U. S. 466).

The state of Maryland may tax stocks, bonds, etc., issued by other states or by
municipalities, owned by citizens or residents of Maryland, and which are exempt
from taxation by the states or municipalities issuing them. Comity cannot sustain
claims which are contrary to our Constitution. Appeal Tax Court v. Patterson,
50 Md. 372.

If the supreme court of the United States, in speaking of a banking franchise
when bought, means when it says that " the price is paid for the use of the privilege
whilst it lasts, and any tax upon it would substantially be an addition to the price, "
a special legislative charge upon the franchise, the principle is correct; if, however,
it meant a special tax, technically speaking, for the support of the state of Mary-
land, it would be void under this article. Under this article, it cannot be presumed
that a franchise, if the subject of taxation, may by its excessive exercise be destroyed
or rendered valueless. Baltimore v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 291.