CHANCERY. 449

Decree of divorce distinguished from decree of nullity. A bill held not to be one
for divorce, as it set forth none of the causes thereof, and was filed by a third party.
Ridgely v. Ridgely, 79 Md. 305; LeBrun v. LeBrun, 55 Md. 502.

For a case involving the effect of the death of one of the parties upon the divorce
suit, see McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185.

This section referred to in deciding that the act of 1830, ch. 185, sec. 1, had no
relation at the time of its adoption to proceedings for divorce. Chappell v. Chap-
pell, 86 Md. 541.

For cases involving the effect of the acts of 1841, ch. 262, and 1844, ch. 306, upon
the legislative power to grant divorces, see Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429; Smith v.
Devecom, 30 Md. 480; Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 493; Jamison v. Jamison, 4 Md.
Ch. 293. (For present law on this subject, see Md. Constitution).

This section referred to in construing sec. 38—see notes thereto. Fleegle v.
Fleegle, 136 Md. 632.

As to alimony, see sec. 14. See also notes to secs. 14, 38, 39 and 40.

Testimony of the plaintiff in divorce cases must be corroborated—art. 35, sec. 4.

An. Code, sec. 37. 1904, sec. 36. 1888, sec. 36. 1841, ch. 262, sec. 2. 1844, ch. 306.
1846, ch. 340. 1849, ch. 245. 1872, ch. 272. 1888, ch. 486.

38. Upon a hearing of any bill for a divorce, the court may decree a
divorce a vinculo matrimonii for the following causes, to wit: first, the
impotence of either party at the time of the marriage; secondly, for any
cause which, by the laws of this State, render a marriage null and void
ab initio; thirdly, for adultery; fourthly, when the court shall be satisfied
by competent testimony that the party complained against has abandoned
the party complaining, and that such abandonment has continued uninter-
ruptedly for at least three years, and is deliberate and final, and the separa-
tion of the parties beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation;
fifthly, when the woman before marriage has been guilty of illicit carnal
intercourse with another man, the. same being unknown to the husband at
the time of the marriage, and when such carnal connection shall be proved
to the satisfaction of the court.

Abandonment.

Abandonment to constitute a ground of divorce under this section, must be the
deliberate act of the defendant done with the intent to terminate the marriage
relations; proof of abandonment. The facts upon which the opinion of a witness
as to the nature of the abandonment are based, must be stated. Abandonment
not made out. Twigg v. Twigg, 107 Md. 677; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 101 Md. 427;
Gill v. Gill, 93 Md. 652; Goodhues v. Goodhues, 90 Md. 292; Lynch v. Lynch,
33 Md. 329; Levering v. Levering, 16 Md. 218. Cf. Matthews v. Matthews, 112
Md. 583.

When the action of the husband in compelling his wife to leave him, will amount
to an abandonment by the husband; abandonment not made out. Levering v.
Levering, 16 Md. 218; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 101 Md. 432; Harding v. Harding, 22
Md. 337.

In order to secure a divorce on the ground of abandonment the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant deliberately left him with the intent to bring the mar-
riage relations to an end; that the separation has continued uninterruptedly for
three years, and that there is no reasonable hope of a reconciliation. Tomkey v.
Tomkey, 130 Md. 295.

What amounts to abandonment under this section. The permanent and irre-
vocable refusal, without proper cause, of the wife to have sexual intercourse con-
stitutes abandonment. Fleegle v. Fleegle, 136 Md. 632.

Generally.

This and the following section are not penal in their nature; they prescribe a
remedy by civil suit for the violation of marital obligations. Act of 1872, ch. 272,
is valid, although it had a retroactive operation. Elliott v. Elliott, 38 Md. 361;
Dimpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 338; Herbert v. Gray, 38 Md. 534.

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