2996 ARTICLE 93.

of her husband subscribed to said will; provided always, that the wife
shall have been privately examined by the witnesses to her will, apart from
and out of the presence and hearing of her husband, whether she doth
make the same will freely and voluntarily, and without being induced
thereto by fear or threats of, or ill usage by, her said husband, and says
she does it willingly and freely; but no will under this section shall be
valid unless made at least sixty days before the death of the testatrix. This
section not to apply to property acquired since January 12, 1860.

A married woman may devise or bequeath all her property, real and personal,
which belonged to her at the time of her death if that took place since the adoption
of the Code of 1860, and all property which she has acquired since that time.
Schull v. Murray, 32 Md. 16.

This section held to refer only to wife's general property, and not to her sole
and separate estate. History of this section. Buchanan v. Turner, 26 Md. 5.
And see Schull v. Murray, 32 Md. 16.

A will held not to be executed in due form under this section because written
consent of husband was not annexed thereto, and also because it was not executed
sixty days before her death. Hanson v. Johnson, 62 Md. 27. And see Michael v.
Baker, 12 Md. 168.

This section held to have no application to execution of a power by a paper in
nature of a will, where such paper is executed in accordance with directions in deed
creating power. Schley v. McCeney, 36 Md. 273. And see Michael v. Baker, 12
Md. 168.

Act of 1842, ch. 293, cited but not construed in Oswald v. Hoover, 43 Md. 370.
As to the powers and rights of married women in general, see art. 45.

An. Code, sec. 336. 1904, sec. 329. 1888, sec. 321. 1849, ch. 229.

346. Every last will and testament executed in due form of law after
the first day of June, 1850, shall pass all the real estate which the testator
had at the time of his death.

Where a testator bequeaths all that he " is worth, amounting to $4300 or there-
about which is now in possession of Carroll Spence as trustee," to his two sisters, the
will does not operate to pass a portion of estate in hands of Safe Deposit Company.
Mere fact that will was made 57 years before testator's death would not prevent its
operating upon property owned by testator at time of his death, if that was his in-
tention. Presumption against intestacy. History of this section. Albert v. Safe De-
posit Co., 132 Md. 109.

A devise or bequest of all testator's real or personal property passes all of his
property which he could dispose of by will at time of his death. Redwood v.
Howison, 129 Md. 590.

This section makes the will speak as to subject matter of disposition, as of
time of testator's death, changing the former rule in that respect. Lavender v.
Rosenheim, 110 Md. 155; Bourke v. Boone, 94 Md. 477.

This section does not operate to pass " after-acquired" property contrary to
testator's intention. Lindsay v. Wilson, 103 Md. 268; Bourke v. Boone, 94 Md. 477;
Rizer v. Perry, 58 Md. 134; Rea v. Twilley, 35 Md. 411; Taylor v. Watson, 35
Md. 519.

A will executed in conformity with sec. 344 is as much " in due form of law " as
one executed under sec. 332. The fact that a testator did not know, when his
will is drawn, that he would acquire certain property, does not prevent application
of this section. Lindsay v. Wilson, 103 Md. 268.

Where a devise of real estate fails by reason of incapacity of devisee, such real
estate does not pass by virtue of this section to the residuary devisee in the will.
Rizer v. Perry, 58 Md. 134.

This section applied. Ruckle v. Grafflin, 86 Md. 631; Brady v. Brady, 78 Md. 474.

This section referred to in deciding that a devisee is a competent witness to a will,
and that devise is not void because of his being such witness. Leitch v. Leitch,
114 Md. 336.

This section docs not embrace a will executed prior to June 1, 1850—change
made in act of 1849, ch. 229, by adoption of Code of 1860. John v. Hodges,
33 Md. 522. And see Carroll v. Carroll, 16 How. 275.