TESTAMENTARY LAW. 2991

This section in connection with art. 45, sec. 7, entitles a surviving husband to
dower in real estate devised to his wife, where wife dies before testator. Vogel v.

Turnt, 110 Md. 201.

The terms " lapse " and " fail of taking effect," defined. Billingsley v. Tongue, 9

Md. 581.

This section referred to in deciding that the lapsing of a bequest of corporate
stock is governed by the lex domcilii. Lowndes v. Coooh, 87 Md. 485.

A testator is presumed to have known that by death of his daughter (before testa-
tor), what he had intended as her share had gone to his three surviving children
under his will, or that it would lapse or be saved from lapsing by this section; in
either event children of another deceased daughter of testator would take what would
have been their mother's share in estate of daughter first mentioned if she had sur-
vived testator. Duering v. Brill, 127 Md: 112.

It is presumed that a testator made his will in view of this section, and that he
intended in the event his wife was not living at the time of his death that his estate
should go to those who were her heirs or next of kin at his death, unless a contrary
intention appears; no such intent held to appear. This section applied. See notes
to secs. 310 and 346. Redwood v. Howison, 129 Md. 593.

Although where a question of title to real estate is involved, the matter is beyond
jurisdiction of orphans' court, that court has the power to determine who are next of
kin, and if the ultimate distribution of property is controlled by this section, orphans'
court has jurisdiction. Necessary and proper parties to proceedings in orphans'
court. McComas v. Wiley, 132 Md. 410.

A bequest saved by this section from lapsing goes direct to the deceased legatee's
representatives without vesting in his executor or administrator, and is not liable for
his debts. Vogel v. Turnt, 110 Md. 199; Wallace v. DuBois, 65 Md. 161; Glenn v.
Belt, 7 G. & J. 367; Hemsley v. Hollingsworth, 119 Md. 440; McLaughlin v. McGee,
131 Md. 165 (decided prior to the act of 1920, ch. 202); Courtenay v. Courtenay,
138 Md. 205 (testatrix died in 1918); McComas v. Wiley, 134 Md. 574 (decided in
1919). And see McComas v. Wiley, 135 Md. 587.

A legacy saved from lapsing under this section cannot be bequeathed by legatee's
will. Object of this section. The effect of a residuary bequest by A. to B. where sub-
sequently B. dies leaving all her property to A. Glenn v. Belt, 7 G. & J. 365.

The power of devising was not enlarged by this section; a legatee who dies before
the testator cannot bequeath what he would have received if he had survived, inas-
much as at time of his death he has nothing to will. McLaughlin v. McGee, 131
Md. 165 (decided prior to act of 1920, ch. 202).

Questions of survivorship in case of death in a common disaster dealt with.
McComas v. Wiley, 134 Md. 574; McComas v. Wiley, 135 Md. 587. See art. 35,
sec. 71.

Estates tail general upon being converted into fee simple estates are saved from
lapse by this section; contra, as to estates tail special. Pennington v. Pennington,
70 Md. 435.

Under act of 1810, ch. 34, sec. 4, if legacy is charged upon real estate and legatee
dies after testator but before time of payment, legacy is lost. Helms v. Franciscus,
2 Bl. 560.

Cited but not construed in Taylor v. Watson, 35 Md. 529; Darrington v. Rogers,
1 Gill, 410.

As to the jurisdiction of equity over suits for legacies, see art. 16, sec. 100.

An. Code, sec. 327. 1904, sec. 321. 1888, sec. 314. 1825, ch. 119.

336. In every will whereby any lands or real property shall be devised
to any person, and no words of perpetuity or limitation are used in such
devise, the devisee shall take under and by virtue of such devise the entire
and absolute estate and interest of the testator in such lands or real prop-
erty, unless it shall appear, by devise over or by words of limitation or
otherwise, that the testator intended to devise a less estate and interest.

Application of this section.

A contingent limitation over is not inconsistent with a devise of a fee simple
estate, and, therefore, does not interfere with application of this section. Devecmon
v. Shaw, 70 Md. 225; Gambrill v. Forest, etc., Lodge, 66 Md. 25; Estep v. Mackey,
52 Md. 599; Bradford v. Mackenzie, 131 Md. 334.