2218 ARTICLE 67.
A suit under this section cannot be maintained against a board of county school
commissioners. Weddle v. School Commissioners, 94 Md. 342.
Where a sheriff is charged with permitting a lynching, his bond cannot be sued
under this section. Cocking v. Wade, 87 Md. 529.
The declaration.
A declaration under this section in .a suit growing out of death of an infant 'child,
held to be sufficient under art. 75, secs. 2 and 3, of the Code. American Exp. Co. v.
Denowitch, 132 Md. 74.
The narr, need not allege that defendant's negligence was such that if death had
not ensued, deceased would have been entitled to recover. Philadelphia, etc., R. R.
Co. v. State, use Bitzer, 58 Md. 399.
The declaration may be amended by adding the state as legal plaintiff (so as to
conform to titling and summons). B. & O. R. R. Co. v. State, use Allison, 62 Md. 481.
For a form of declaration in a suit for personal injuries caused by negligence, see
art. 75, sec. 28, sub-sections 36 and 37.
Generally.
The right of action under this section and sec. 2 distinguished from, and compared
with, that of personal representative of deceased under art. 93, sec. 106. History
and purpose of the two enactments traced. They are entirely separate, independent
and exclusive of each other. This section created a new cause of action which
deceased never had. Construction of Lord Campbell's Act from which this section
was taken. Stewart v. United, etc., Co., 104 Md. 333; Droneburg v. Harris, 108
Md. 608; Melitch v. United Rwys. & Elec. Co., 121 Md. 458; White v. Safe Dep. &
Tr. Co., 140 Md. 598.
As to the similarity of this section to Lord Campbell's Act, see also Tucker v. State,
use Johnson, 80 Md 475; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. State, use Hauer, 60 Md. 466;
Philadelphia, etc., R. R Co. v. State, use Bitzer, 58 Md. 398; State, use Alien v.
Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Md. 47; Melitch v. United Rwys. & Elec. Co., 121
Md. 458.
While burden in beginning is on plaintiff to show a -prima facie wrongful killing,
if defendant alleges justification or excuse, burden is on him to prove it. Tucker v.
State, use Johnson, 89 Md. 489. (See dissenting opinion also for discussion of burden
of proof.)
This section has no application where injury occurs outside of Maryland, although
deceased is a citizen of this state. State, use Alien, v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 45
Md. 45; Dronenburg v. Harris, 108 Md. 608.
Where a sheriff is charged with permitting a lynching, his bond cannot be sued
under this section. The cause of action depends entirely upon this article and it
must be prosecuted in the manner herein prescribed only. It. cannot be converted
into an ex Contractu action, as it has no reference to a contract, or a bond, or any
responsibility arising therefrom. Cocking v. Wade, 87 Md. 545 (concurring opinion).
In order to maintain a suit under, this article, equitable plaintiffs must show a
pecuniary interest in life of deceased; jury may not consider the pain and suffering
of deceased nor mental suffering of equitable plaintiffs. This article contrasted with
Lord Campbell's Act. Elder v. B. & O. R. R, Co., 126 Md. 498.
A suit under this and the following sections should have been withdrawn from
jury as to one defendant under the doctrine of assumption of risk, and was properly
withdrawn as to other defendant because there was no evidence of negligence.
Westinghouse E. & Mfg. Co. v. Monroe,. 129 Md. 61.
The compromise and settlement of a separate suit against a wrongdoer who is
severally liable with defendant for a tort, held to bar a suit under this section since
there can be but one compensation for same injury. Cox v. Md. Elec. Rwys. Co.,
126 Md. 301.
In a suit under this article the evidence of a father as to number and ages of
his children when offered for purpose of showing that deceased took care of younger
children, thus saving expense of an attendant, and leaving the mother free to aid her
husband in his business, is admissible. U. Rwys. & E. Co. of Balto, v. Mantik,
127 Md. 205.
Where an injured person dies after having for a valuable consideration executed
to party who injured him a release of all claim which he might or could possibly
have for or on account of his injuries, no action lies under this and following sections.
Melitch v. United Rwys. & Elec. Co., 121 Md. 457.
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