MECHANICS' LIEN. 2143

a separate contract, after first contract has been performed. Brunt v. Farinholt Co.,
121 Md. 132.

Object of the notice to owner. The material man's right to lien is not affected
by whether owner has money in his hands due builder, or whether former has per-
formed his contract with latter. Treusch v. Shryock, 51 Md. 171. And see German,
etc., Church v. Heise, 44 Md. 473; New England, etc., Co. v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 11
Md. 90.

The obligation of complying with this section is imperative, and intention is
that notice shall be served personally upon owner whenever that can be done.
Place of residence of owner passed upon. Hill v. Kaufman, 98 Md. 251.

If after a contract is completed, goods are delivered by a material man for pur-
pose of extending time within which notice may be served on the owner, lien is
invalid. Greenway v. Turner, 4 Md. 304. And see Heath v. Tyler, 44 Md. 317.

The notice is not amendable under sec. 41, after the expiration of the sixty days.
Kenly v. Sisters of Charity, 63 Md. 311.

While lien may be enforced if this section is complied with, the law raises no
assumpsit as between owner and claimant. Kees v. Kerney, 5 Md. 421.

The notice required by this section, held to have been given. Wilson v. Simon,
91 Md. 4; Hensel v. Johnson, 94 Md. 735.

This section held inapplicable because contract was made with owner and not
with contractor. First Natl Bank v. White, 114 Md. 615; Rust v. Chisolm, 57
Md. 383; Miller v. Barroll, 14 Md. 174.

Cited but not construed in Blake v. Pitcher, 46 Md. 465; Pue v. Hetzell, 16 Md.
549; Shoop v. Powles, 13 Md. 309; Md. Casualty Co. v. Lacios, 121 Md. 688.

See notes to secs. 10, 12, 16 and 23.

An. Code, sec. 12. 1904, sec. 12. 1888, sec. 12. 1845, ch. 176, sec. 2.

12. If such notice can not be given on account of absence or other
causes, the claimant or his agent may, in the presence of a competent wit-
ness and within sixty days, place said notice upon the door or other front
part of said building and shall file a claim with the clerk of the circuit
court for the county or the superior court of Baltimore city, as the case
may be, as hereinafter mentioned.

This section does not give claimant an option, but can only be availed of when
it is proven that notice required by sec. 11 is impracticable. Held that claimant was
not entitled to resort to this section. Hill v. Kaufman, 98 Md. 251; Hensel v. John-
son, 94 Md. 735; Kenly v. Sisters of Charity, 63 Md. 309.

The notice prescribed by this section should be addressed to person for whom it
is intended, owner or his agent, naming him. Hensel v. Johnson, 94 Md. 736; Kenly
v. Sisters of Charity, 63 Md. 310.

An. Code, sec. 13. 1904, sec. 13. 1888, sec. 13. 1845, ch. 287, sec. 8.

13. In all cases in which a contractor or builder of a house shall have
purchased materials or contracted for work and the party with whom such
contract was made shall have given notice as required in the two preced-
ing sections to the owner of such building, it shall be lawful for the owner
to retain from the cost of such building the amount which he may ascer-
tain to be due to the party giving such notice; and in case any lien be laid
by the party giving such notice and be also laid by the contractor or
builder, the said contractor or builder shall receive only the difference be-
tween the amount due him and that due the person giving the notice.

The notice required by sec. 11 is in order to enable owner to comply with this
section. Fulton v. Parlett, 104 Md. 66. And see Greenway v. Turner, 4 Md. 304.

This section referred to in determining the sufficiency of a notice under sec. 11.
Thomas v. Barber, 10 Md. 391.

See notes to sec. 1.