2062 ARTICLE 57.

When statute begins to run.

The statute only begins to run upon expiration of time for payment of money
secured by a bond. Glasgow v. Porter, 1 H. & J. 109.

Limitations runs on a bond from time of breach. The act of 1715, ch. 23, sec. 6,
and act of 1729, ch. 24, sec. 21, discussed in connection with each other. Thurston v.
Blackiston, 36 Md. 509; Byrd v. State, 44 Md. 501; Brumbaugh v. Schleigh, 54
Md. 647; Scaggs v. Reilly, 88 Md. 65.

The statute begins to run against the suit of a ward on her guardian's bond, from
the time she is of age. State v. Henderson, 54 Md. 346.

The statute begins to run against right to revive judgment from date of judgment,
and is not suspended by death and failure to obtain administration on estate of
judgment creditor. Brooks v. Preston, 106 Md. 705.

Allowing thirteen months for the settlement of an estate, the twelve years within
which an administrator's bond could be sued, had not elapsed, and statute was no
bar. Hagerty v. Mann, 56 Md. 526.

Where upon dissolution of a firm, one partner covenants to pay the debts and to
release the other from same, statute begins to run against the covenantee, after a
reasonable time from date of such covenant. Dorsey v. Dashiell, 1 Md. 198.

Where executor pays a legacy in full and takes a bond conditioned upon an
insufficiency of assets, statute begins to run from the date of the discovery of such
insufficiency. Salisbury v. Black, 6 H. & J. 297.

The statute begins to run as to judgments from date of judgment and is not
suspended by death of debtor, or neglect of those entitled to obtain administration
upon his estate. Lang v. Wilmer, 131 Md. 227.

Revival of the debt.

The construction of this section with reference to a revival of the debt is different
from that of sec. 1. Neither an acknowledgment of debt nor an express promise to
pay same, will arrest operation of statute. There must be an express promise to
pay after statute has become a bar. Brooks v. Preston, 106 Md. 706; St. Mark's
Church v. Miller, 99 Md. 26; Wright v. Gilbert, 51 Md. 156; Leonard v. Hughlett,
41 Md. 387; Felty v. Young, 18 Md. 167; Young v. Mackall, 3 Md. Gh. 398; Carroll
v. Waring, 3 G. & J. 503; Willard v. Wood, 164 U. S. 522. And see Post v. Mackall,
3 Bl. 520.

Where a new promise revives a specialty barred by statute, suit must be upon
new promise. Felty v. Young, 18 Md. 167; Young v. Mackall, 4 Md. 367; Veasey v.
Bassett, 7 H. & J. 461.

The action upon the new promise is itself barred after three years. Young v.
Mackall, 4 Md. 372; Young v. Mackall, 3 Md. Ch. 398.

Limitations in equity.

Equity follows the law and acts in obedience to this section. Knight v. Brawner,
14 Md. 7; Hagerty v. Mann, 56 Md. 526; Weaver v. Leiman, 52 Md. 714; Insolvent
Estate of Leiman, 32-Md. 240; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 21 Md. 590; Young v. Mackall,
3 Md. Ch. 398; McDowell v. Goldsmith, 2 Md. Ch. 390; Watkins v. Harwood, 2
G. & J. 310.

As to limitations in equity, see also notes to sec. 1.

Mortgages.

While mortgage notes are barred after three years, the covenant in a mortgage
is only barred after twelve years. Earnshaw v. Stewart, 64 Md. 516.

A defectively executed and unrecorded mortgage, prevents the operation of the
statute within twelve years. Nelson v. Hagerstown Bank, 27 Md. 75.

This section is not applicable to an equitable lien such as a mortgage which can
only be barred by a lapse of twenty years. B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Trimble, 51 Md.
109; Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bl. 281. See also Moreton v. Harrison, 1 Bl. 491; Ohio
Life Ins. Co. v. Winn, 4 Md. Ch. 254.

Generally.

A fieri facias issued on a judgment within the statutory period and renewed from
term to term, though never delivered to sheriff, keeps judgment alive. Hagerstown
Bank v. Thomas, 35 Md. 515. Cf. Johnson v. Hines, 61 Md. 127.

A bond held to be a " testamentary bond " within the meaning of this section.
State v. Boyd, 2 G. & J. 372.