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1738 ARTICLE 47.
as used in this section means an inability to pay debts as they become due in
ordinary course of business. Intention of this section; when a party subjects him-
self to its provisions. Castleberg v. Wheeler, 68 Md. 275.
An attempt to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent and made in contempla-
tion of insolvency, denied. What must be established to avoid such a conveyance?
Lapse of time between the conveyance and the application in insolvency. Powles
v. Dilley, 9 Gill, 231; Beatty v. Davis, 9 Gill, 218; Malcolm v. Hall, 9 Gill, 180;
Powles v. Dilley, 2 Md. Ch. 123; Glenn v. Baker, 1 Md. Ch. 76. And see Brooks v.
Thomas, 8 Md. 371; Dulaney v. Hoffman, 7 G. & J. 175; Hickley v. Farmers'
Bank, 5 G. & J. 380.
It is immaterial whether the preferences appear upon face of a written instru-
ment, or are created by payments, transfers or otherwise, they are all void. When
they are made the basis of an adjudication, the latter ipso facto strikes them
down. Vogler v. Rosenthal, 85 Md. 45. See also Applegarth v. Wagner, 86 Md. 475.
A judgment to the effect that a party is not entitled to a discharge because of
having made a deed to B. which was a preference, is not an adjudication in rem
and conclusive upon rights of B. The status of property is not involved in such
verdict and it is not evidence against B. After the lapse of twenty years an in-
solvent estate is presumed to be closed, and equity will not entertain a bill to set
aside conveyances made by insolvent before his application unless it is satisfied
that there are subsisting debts due by the insolvent. Both intent to take the bene-
fit of insolvency and to give an unlawful preference, must appear to bring an
act under this section. 'Proximity of time as an element in determining such in-
tent. Syester v. Brewer, 27 Md. 313. See also Maennel v. Murdock, 13 Md. 177;
Powles v. Dilley, 9 Gill, 222.
Whatever is the necessary consequence of an act deliberately done, the law pre-
sumes every man to intend. When the quo animo becomes an inference of law.
Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gill, 404.
Fact that a debtor at time he executed a conveyance could not apply for bene-
fit of insolvent laws, is a strong circumstance to prove that it was not executed
in contemplation of insolvency. Glenn v. Baker, 1 Md. Ch. 76.
The reservation in a deed for the benefit of creditors of a fee for the draftsman
of the deed is a preference. Wolfsheimer v. Rivinus, 64 Md. 235.
For conveyances, etc., held to be preferences and void, see Clark Co. v. Colton,
91 Md. 207; Applegarth v. Wagner, 86 Md. 475; Whedbee v. Stewart, 40 Md. 421.
For conveyances held to be bona fide, and hence within proviso contained in
last clause of this section, see Nicholson v. Schmucker, 81 Md. 464; Hinkleman v.
Fey, 79 Md. 114.
Generally.
Where a conveyance or payment is void, the title to the property vests in. the
insolvent trustee. Prayers correctly setting forth the facts requisite to bring a
case under this section. Willison v. Frostburg Bank, 80 Md. 210.
Where a debtor has been adjudged insolvent on other grounds, or where the pro-
ceedings are voluntary, the trustee must proceed in other forums to have trans-
fers, assignment, etc., set aside. This was connection in which language quoted in
Paul v. Locust Point Co., 70 Md. 292, from Purviance v. Glenn, 8 Md. 206, was
used. Vogler v. Rosenthal, 85 Md. 46.
A conveyance made void by this section may be so declared and treated by in-
solvent court, although such conveyance was made to a non-resident and grantee
was not summoned and did not participate in insolvency proceedings. The ad-
judication based upon conveyance of necessity involves the determination that
conveyance is void. Brown v. Smart, 69 Md. 329 (affirmed in 145 U. S. 457); Vogler
v. Rosenthal, 85 Md. 45.
While a mortgage may be void as a preference, note to secure which mortgage
was given, may be valid. Frederick, etc., Co. v. Michael, 81 Md. 487.
What a bill to set aside deeds as in fraud of our insolvent system must allege.
Faringer v. Ramsay, 4 Md. Ch. 38.
For cases where purchasers were held not to have acted bona fide, see Smith v.
Pattison, 84 Md. 345.
For a note upon fraudulent conveyances, see Swan v. Dent, 2 Md. Ch. 111.
For cases apparently now inapplicable to this section because of changes in the
law, see Whedbee v. Stewart, 40 Md. 421; Mackintosh v. Corner, 33 Md. 605;
Zeigler v. King, 9 Md. 330.
Cited but not construed in Third Natl. Bank v. Lanahan, 66 Md. 469.
See secs. 8 and 22 and notes.
As to conveyances from husband to wife, see art. 45, secs. 1 and 2.
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