INSOLVENTS. 1733

An. Code, sec. 8. 1904, sec. 8. 1888, sec. 8. 1854, ch. 193, sec. 7.

8. Any confession of judgment, and any conveyance or assignment
made by any insolvent tinder this article, for the purpose of defrauding
his creditors or giving an undue preference, shall be void, and the prop-
erty or thing conveyed' or assigned shall vest in the trustee; and all acts
done by the petitioner before his application, when he shall have had no
reasonable expectation of being exempted from liability to execution, on
account of his debts or responsibilities, without petitioning for the benefit
of the insolvent laws, shall be deemed to be within the meaning and pur-
view of this section.

When conveyances, etc., are fraudulent and void.

This section contemplates a class of cases in which the acts of an insolvent can-
not be avoided although he may be actually insolvent at the time. The terms " no
reasonable expectation of being exempted," etc., imply a knowledge or belief on
the part of the insolvent of his inability to pay his debts. This section makes void
or voidable only such acts as the debtor may be presumed to have done in deroga-
tion of the rights of creditors, with the view of becoming an insolvent. Williams v.
Cohen, 25 Md. 497.

The preference referred to in this section is one given in contemplation of in-
solvency. A deed for the benefit of creditors held valid under this section. Mc-
Colgan v. Hopkins, 17 Md. 401. See also Malcolm v. Hall, 9 Gill, 180.

Where the grantor in a deed never takes the benefit of the insolvent law, it
cannot be claimed that the deed was made with a view of becoming an insolvent.
A construction of the words " with a view " of becoming an insolvent. Wheeler v.
Stone, 4 Gill, 46.

Transfers valid, although made when the debtor was in failing circumstances.
Glenn v. Grover, 3 Md. 225; State v. Bank of Maryland, 6 G. & J. 220.

The fact that a deed in the nature of a mortgage provides for the payment of
debts barred by a discharge in insolvency, does not render such deed fraudulent
in fact. Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 528.

An attempt to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent and made in contemplation
of insolvency, denied. What must be established to avoid such a conveyance?
Lapse of time between the conveyance and the application in insolvency. Powles
v. Dilley, 2 Md. Ch. 123; Glenn v. Baker, 1 Md. Ch. 76; Malcolm v. Hall, 9 Gill,
180; Beatty v. Davis, 9 Gill, 218; Powles v. Dilley, 9 Gill, 231.

A judgment to the effect that a party is not entitled to a discharge because of
having made a deed to B. which was a preference, is not an adjudication in rent
and conclusive upon the rights of B. The status of the property is not involved
in such verdict and it is not evidence against B. After the lapse of twenty years,
an insolvent estate is presumed to be closed, and equity will not entertain a bill
to set aside conveyances made by the insolvent before his application, unless it is
satisfied that there are subsisting debts due by the insolvent. Both the intent to
take the benefit of insolvency and to give an unlawful preference must appear to
bring an act under this section. Proximity of time as an element in determining
such intent. Syester v. Brewer, 27 Md. 313. See also Maennel v. Murdock, 13
Md. 177; Falconer v. Clark, 7 Md. 177; Powles v. Dilley, 9 Gill, 222.

Assignment held to have been made with an expectation of becoming an insol-
vent. Proximity of time of assignment and application. Dulaney v. Hoffman, 7
G. & J. 175; Brooks v. Thomas, 8 Md. 371. For a failure of such proof, see Hickey
v. Farmers' Bank, 5 G. & J. 380.

Whatever is the necessary consequence of an act deliberately done, the law pre-
sumes every man to intend. When the quo animo becomes an inference of law.
Correct instruction under this section. Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gill, 404.

What amounts to a preference? Hodson v. Karr, 96 Md. 479.

For a sale held to have been made for the purpose of defrauding creditors, see
Smith v. Pattison, 84 Md. 344.

For a transfer from a husband to his wife held void upon a bill in equity by the
insolvent trustee, see Manning v. Carruthers, 83 Md. 1.

For deeds of trust for the benefit of creditors, conveyances, assignments, trans-
fers, etc., not involving insolvents, but which were attacked as fraudulent, see