EVIDENCE. 1379

Smith v. Wood, 31 Md. 296; Williams v. Higgins, 30 Md. 407; Cooke v. Cooke,
29 Md. 550; Neidig v. Whiteford, 29 Md. 184.

This section referred to in construing secs. 1 and 4—see notes thereto. Turpin v.
State, 55 Md. 475. And see Davis v. State, 38 Md. 57 (dissenting opinion).

Purpose and intent of evidence acts. Grove v. Funk, et al., 131 Md. 694.

Cited but not construed in Schley v. Merritt, 37 Md. 358; Taylor v. Hill, 36 Md.
501; Elosser v. Fletcher, 126 Md. 251.

An. Code, sec. 4. 1904, sec. 4. 1888, sec. 3. 1864, ch. 109, sec. 3. 1876, ch. 357. 1888, ch. 545.

4. In the trial of all indictments, complaints and other proceedings
against persons charged with the commission of crimes and offenses, and
in all proceedings in the nature of criminal proceedings in any court of
this State, and before a justice of the peace or other officer acting judi-
cially, the person so charged shall at his own request, but not otherwise,
be deemed a competent witness; but the neglect or refusal of any such
person to testify shall not create any presumption against him. In all
criminal proceedings the husband or wife of the accused party shall be
competent to testify; but in no case, civil or criminal, shall any husband
or wife be competent to disclose any confidential communication made by
the one to the other during the marriage; and in suits, actions, bills or
other proceedings instituted in consequence of adultery, or for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce, or for damages for breach of promise of marriage,
no verdict shall be permitted to be recovered, nor shall any judgment or
decree be entered upon the testimony of the plaintiff alone; but in all such
cases testimony in Corroboration of that of the plaintiff shall be necessary.

Where there is no possibility of collusion the Corroboration required by this sec-
tion in divorce cases need be slight. Abandonment made out. Heinmuller v. Hein-
muller, 133 Md. 494.

A divorce will not be granted on the ground of cruelty where plaintiff's evidence
is not corroborated. Dicus v. Dicus, 131 Md. 88.

Where traverser voluntarily becomes a witness but remains silent as to pertinent
matters, the state's attorney is entitled to comment before the jury upon his silence
and other conduct on witness stand. Brashears v. State, 58 Md. 567.

In a prosecution for bigamy, the first wife of the accused is a competent witness
against him under this section, though she cannot be compelled to testify. Richard-
son v. State, 103 Md. 117.

The portion of sec. 1 making parties and their wives and husbands "competent
and compellable to give evidence," applies to civil cases only; this is true not-
withstanding repeal by act of 1876, ch. 357, of third section of act of 1864, ch. 109.
Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 475; Classen v. Classen, 57 Md. 511. And see Davis v.
State, 38 Md. 65 (dissenting opinion).

Under act of 1864, ch 109, an accessory before the fact was incompetent to testify
for a principal felon, and this is true although they were indicted and tried sepa-
rately. Davis v. State, 38 Md. 49 (cf. dissenting opinions, pages 57 and 64).

In a divorce case where the only testimony corroborating plaintiff is that of a
witness who gives it as her opinion that the separation is deliberate and final, but
who states no facts as a basis for such opinion, such Corroboration is not sufficient.
This section construed in connection with art. 16, sec. 38. Twigg v. Twigg, 107
Md. 677. And see Goodhues v. Goodhues, 90 Md. 292.

The portion of this section providing for the Corroboration of the plaintiff's testi-
mony in a suit for divorcR, held to prevent a decree. Tomkey v. Tomkey, 130 Md.
295; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 142 Md. 561.

See art. 22 of the Declaration of Rights.

As to divorce and the effect of an admission by the defendant, see art. 16, sec.
37, et seq.

An. Code, sec. 5. 1904, sec. 5. 1888, sec. 4. 1864, ch. 109, sec. 4.

5. In all cases where a party to any suit, action or other proceeding
shall be examined by any opposing party the testimony given on said ex-