ART. III] LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. 51

time be printed, published and certified under the Great Seal, to the
several courts, in the same manner as has been heretofore usual in this
State.

Governor's signature.

Where a bill is passed and sealed as directed, it may be presented to
the Governor and signed after the close of the session of the legislature,
provided the Governor signs it within -six days from the time the bill is
presented. Lankford v. Somerset County, 73 Md. 105. (See also, con-
curring and dissenting opinions in this ease.)

If a bill is not sealed as required by this section, there is no legal
presentation of it to the Governor, and hence he may properly refuse to
sign it. Section 17 of article 2, is consistent with this section. The scope
of articles 2 and 3 of the constitution, differentiated. Hamilton v. State
ex rel. Wells, 61 Md. 28.

Where the Governor signs a bill by inadvertence and under a misappre-
hension as to what the paper is, and without having gone through the
mental operation of approving the bill, he does not approve it as required
by this section, and his signature is null and void in so far as it affords
evidence of his approval thereof. No one other than the Governor has
possession of a bill after it is signed by him until it is sent to the clerk
of the court of appeals. Allegany County v. Warfield, 100 Md. 518.

Generally.

Courts are not precluded by an authentication of a statute in the man-
ner prescribed by this section from passing upon the question of whether
the bill was constitutionally passed; but an authenticated statute cannot
be impeached by the legislative journals alone or by mere parol evidence.
Cases reviewed and distinguished. Evidence held insufficient to overcome
the due authentication of an act. The bill need be engrossed only in the
house in which it originated. Ridgely v. Baltimore, 119 Md. 583; Berry v.
Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 41 Md. 461 ; Legg v. Annapolis, 42 Md. 220; Jes-
sup v. Baltimore, 121 Md. 562.

In proving the contents of an act of assembly, the court cannot permit
extrinsic evidence so as to go behind the evidence provided for by this
section; hence it may not be proved that the provisions of an act are
different from those set out in the published volume which is an exact
transcript of the copy recorded in the court of appeals, under this section.
Object of this section. Annapolis v. Harwood, 32 Md. 477; Jessup v.
Baltimore, 321 Md. 562.

This section does not regulate the time when a law shall go into opera-
tion—see section 31. If an act expressly provides when it shall take
effect, it will be effective accordingly whether it has then been published
or not. Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 109.

This section referred to in construing article 15 of the declaration of
rights—see notes thereto. State v. C. & P. R. R. Co., 40 Md. 53 (dissenting
opinion).

This section referred to in construing article 14, section 1—see notes
thereto. Warfield v. Vandiver. 101 Md. 114.

Cited but not construed in Dunn v. Brager. 116 Md. 242. 244.

Sec. 31. No law passed by the General Assembly shall take effect
until the first day of June next after the session at which it may be
passed, unless it be otherwise expressly declared therein.

The enacting clause as well as the repealing clause of the act of 1854,
chapter 153, rescinding a portion of the act of 1705, chapter 56, held to
be controlled by this section. Risewick v. Davis, 19 Md. 96.

This section referred to in construing article 3, section 30, and article 2,
section 17—see notes to the former. Lankford v. Somerset County, 73 Md.
122 (concurring opinion).
See notes to section 30.