310 CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS. [ART. 27
more respectable physicians he shall be satisfied that the foetus is dead,
or that no other method will secure the safety of the mother.
The crime of abortion is a misdemeanor at common law when there is
no intent to kill, and this section does not change the rule. Causing the
death of a woman by means of an abortion is manslaughter and not mur-
der. An indictment held not to be for the statutory offense of abortion
but for manslaughter as a consequence of an abortion. In prosecutions for
abortion the death of the woman is no part of the facts which go to consti-
tute the crime. Dying declarations. Worthington v. State, 92 Md. 240.
In an indictment under this section, letters written by the traverser to the
woman containing directions as to bow a certain drug should be taken, and
proof by the woman that she took the drug and in other respects followed
the traverser's instructions, is competent evidence, although the traverser
was not present when the drug was taken and his directions complied
with. A conversation between the traverser and the woman in which she
stated that she had complied with his advice but without producing the
desired effect, is also evidence. The above evidence, if found to be true,
constitutes the crime prohibited by this section. Jones v. State, 70 Md. 32G.
An indictment held to sufficiently negative the proviso at the end of this
section. When two traversers are jointly indicted under this section, decla-
rations of one of them are not evidence against the other unless first there
has been some evidence of a conspiracy or combination between the trav-
ersers to commit the crime charged; however, if the latter evidence conies
in later, the admission of the declarations, though error at the time, is
harmless. The character of the house where the abortion is alleged to have
been committed may be proven. While what the deceased said as to her
then condition and pain, feelings and disease, is admissible, a mere narra-
tive by her of what took place at a certain time is inadmissible. Hays v.
State, 40 Md. 646.
A charge that the traverser solicited a woman to take certain drugs for
the purpose of causing an abortion does not constitute the crime prohibited
by this section, there being no statement that the drugs were actually
taken. There must be an unlawful purpose and an act committed which
would carry it into immediate effect, unless it be prevented by some coun-
teracting force or circumstance which intervenes at the time. Lamb v.
State, 67 Md. 532 (cf. dissenting opinion, p. 536).
1904, art. 27, sec. 4. 1888, art. 27, sec. 4. 1868, ch. 179, sec. 3.
4. It shall be the duty of the judges of the several circuit courts of
this State and of the criminal court of Baltimore to give the preceding
section in charge of the grand jury of their respective courts at each
term of said courts.
Adultery.
Ibid. sec. 5. 1888. art. 27. sec. 5. 1860, ch. 30, sec. 1. 1749, ch. 12.
1815, ch. 27, sec. 3.
5. Any person who shall commit adultery shall upon conviction
thereof in any of the circuit courts for the counties in this State or the
criminal court of Baltimore be fined ten dollars.
Since the penalty prescribed by this section is a pecuniary fine, charging
a person with adultery does not amount per se to slander. Wagaman v.
Byers, 17 Md. 187. And see Shafer v. Ahalt. 48 Md. 173; Griffin v. Moore,
43 Md. 246.
As to pandering, see section 379, et seq.
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