DECLARATION OF EIGHTS. 19

Since an ordinance imposing an assessment upon adjacent property for
the repaying of a street, is the exercise of the taxing power and not of
the right of eminent domain, this article is not violated, although such
ordinance contains no provisions for notice, for a hearing or for a jury
trial on appeal. Baltimore v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 56 Md. 30 (cf, dis-
senting opinion).

Although the court of appeals has decided that a certain ordinance and
tax assessment thereunder were void, and in pursuance thereof, the lower
court has enjoined the collection of the assessment, an act may subse-
quently be passed providing for the collection of an assessment to be paid
to the extent that the property was specially benefited—not the original
assessment, but a new one and not necessarily the same amount. The act
of 1892, chapter 284, held valid. Cases distinguished. Baltimore v. Ulman,
79 Md. 482 (affirmed in 165 U. S. 719). And see Leser v. Wagner, 120
Md. 678.

The act of 1843, chapter 289, requiring the president of corporations to
pay certain taxes on corporate stock, held not to violate this article; mati-
damus is the appropriate remedy. The legislature may not only impose
taxes, but may provide the means and details for their collection. Con-
temporaneous construction of the constitution. State v. Mayhew, 2 G. 496.
And see Faust v. Twenty-third Bldg. Assn., 84 Md. 192; Harrison v. State,
22 Md. 487.

Condemnation.

This article, taken in connection with article 3, section 40, of the Mary-
land constitution, means that private property can only be taken for public
use; what is a public use is a question for the judiciary. Arnsperger v.
Crawford, 101 Md. 251.

The question of whether the taking of property is necessary for the
public purposes of a corporation is one to be determined by the court to
which the inquisition is returned and can not properly arise in an injunc-
tion suit to restrain the condemnation proceedings. Webster v. Susque-
hanna Pole Line Co., 112 Md. 422.

When neither an act nor an ordinance under which certain grading,
paving, etc., are done and which directs an assessment of the cost of such
work upon the abutting property, same to be collected as other taxes are
collected, provides for notice to the parties- to be charged of the doing of
the work or of the assessment therefor, an assessment under such ordi-
nance is void, since it is a taking of property without due process of law.
Due process of law is not confined to judicial proceedings; this article is
a restraint on the legislative and executive powers of the government also.
Ulman v. Baltimore, 72 Md. 589.

The right to use one's lot for pasturing cows in a reasonable way,
although a stream of water which flows through said property may be
polluted, is a right of property, and a corporation doing business lower
down the stream may only acquire the adjacent owner's water right by
making due compensation under article 3, section 40, of the Maryland
constitution. Helfrich v. Catonsville Water Co., 74 Md. 277.

Generally.

Private rights are amply secured by this article and article 19. This
article referred to in discussing the liability of a street railway company
for the erection, by authority, of an elevated railway in the street. Garrett
v. Lake Roland R. R. Co., 79 Md. 290 (dissenting opinion).

This article referred to in holding that the warden of the Maryland
penitentiary might be made a defendant in an ejectment suit; the immu-
nity of the state from suit does not prevent an action against a state
official wrongfully withholding property for state uses. Weyler v. Gibson,
110 Md. 653.

This article referred to in construing article 4, section 37. of the Mary-
land constitution—see notes thereto. Dowling v. Smith, 9 Md. 268.

See article 19 of the declaration of rights, article 15, section 6, and article
3, section 40, of the Maryland constitution, and notes thereto.

See notes to articles 5 and 21 of the declaration of rights.