500 CONVEVANCING. [ART. 21

Under the acts of 1776. ch. 14, and 1715, ch. 47. the enrollment of deeds is
a substitute for, and equivalent to, the act of livery. Rogers v. Sisters of
Charity, 97 Md. 553; Riley v. Carter, 76 Md. 596: Handy v. McKim, 64 Md.
569: Evans v. Horan, 52 Md. 611; Key v. Davis, 1 Md. 39; Mathews v. Ward.
10 G. & J. 448; Smith v. Steels, 3 H. & McH. 104.

As to proof of whether or not a deed was indented, see Gittings v. Hall, 1
H. & J. 14.

1904, art. 21, sec. 24. 1888, art. 21, sec. 24. 1860, art 24, sec. 24. 1782, ch. 23.

24. Any person seized of an estate tail, in possession, reversion or
remainder, in any lands, tenements or hereditaments may grant, sell
and convey the same in the same manner and by the same form of
conveyance as if he were seized of an estate in fee simple; and such
conveyance shall be good and' available, to all intents and purposes,
against all persons whom the grantor might debar by any mode of com-
mon recovery, or by any ways or means whatsoever.

Under this section, an estate in fee tail amounts to a fee simple, Tongue
v. Nutwell, 13 Md. 424. And see Thomas v. Hlgglna, 47 Md. 452; Estep v.
Mackey, 52 Md. 599; Benson v. Linthicum, 75 Md. 144.

Where there Is a Judgment against a tenant in tall who subsequently sells
the property and thus enlarges the estate under this section, the fee simple
estate is not liable to be sold for the payment of the judgment. The words
"debar by any mode of common recovery," construed. Maslin v. Thomas, S
Gill, 18. See also, Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bl. 299.

Under this section, a tenant in tail may defeat the estate altogether or
convey only a qualified estate. Effect of an absolute and also of a qualified
conveyance. Under this section, an estate tail cannot be devised. Laidler v.
Young. 2 H. & J. 71. And see Paca v. Forwood, 2 H. & McH. 176.

The claim of a tenant in tail, held to be barred bv limitations and adverse
possession. Wickes v. Wickes, 98 Md. 318.

An estate tail special, held subject to be docked under this section. Pen-
ningtou v. Pennington, 70 Md. 436. And see Brogden v. Walker, 2 H. & J.
285; Todd v. Pratt, 1 H. & J. 465; Ridgely v. M'Laughlin, 3 H. & McH. 220.

By this section, the ancient mode of docking estates tail by common
recovery is abolished. Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G. 128; Maslin v. Thomas.
8 Gill, 18.

Purpose and construction of this section. Key v. Davis, 1 Md. 41.

This section held to bar the reversionary interest of the proprietary. How-
ard v. Moale. 2 H. & J. 261.

For cases involving the act of descents (1786, ch. 45), as applicable to
estates in tail, see Posey v. Budd, 21 Md. 477; Smith v. Smith, 2 H. & J. 314.
See also, article 46, section 1.

For cases involving estates in tall, see Partridge v. Dorsey, 3 H. & J. 302
Carroll v. Maydwell, 3 H. & J. 292; Jones v. Jones, 2 H. & J. 281; Hopkins

v. Threlkeld, 3 H. & McH. 443; Calvert v. Eden, 2 H. & McH. 279.

This section referred to in construing a will. Chelton v. Heuderson, 9 Gill.
438.

Ibid. sec. 25. 1888, art. 21, sec. 25. 1860, art. 24, sec. 25.
1856, ch. 154, sec. 21.

25. Every power of attorney authorizing an agent or attorney to
sell and convey any real estate shall be attested and acknowledged in
the same manner as a deed, and recorded with the deed executed in pur-
suance of such power of attorney; but a corporation shall have power to
appoint an attorney for the same purpose by its corporate seal.

Where the power of attorney is recorded prior to the recording of the deed,
this section is complied with. Rosenthal v. Ruffin. 60 Md. 326.