380 CHANCERY. [ART. 16

power to decree in such case as if such infant were of full age, or such
non compos mentis of sound mind.

For cases involving the act of 1773, ch. 7, see Partridge v. Dorsey, 3 H.
& J, 302; Owings' Case, 1 Bl., 407.

Cited but not construed in Hamilton v. Traber. 78 Md. 32; Jones v. Bits-
worth, 3 Bl. 193.

1904, art. 16. sec. 96. 1888, art. 16. sec. 85. 1860, art. 16. sec. 72. 1773, ch. 7,

sec. 2. 1778, ch. 22, sec. 4. 1785, ch. 80. sec. 2. 1791,

ch. 79, sec. 4. 1841, ch. 259.

100. Where an infant, or person non compos mentis, is entitled to
any real or personal property in this State bound by any contract, or
where-an infant or a non compos mentis claims any right in such prop-
erty under any contract, the court, in either case, shall have the same
power to decree the execution of such contract, or to pass any just and
proper decree that the court would have if all the parties were of full
age and sound mind; provided, that in all decrees for specific perform-
ance of a contract against an infant, such infant may, at any time
within six months after he arrives at full age, have review of such
decree; and if such infant dies under age, his heir or proper repre-
sentative may have a review of such decree either within six months
after the death of such infant, or within six months after such heir Or
representative attains full age.

What proof may be resorted to by an infant who files a petition under this
section after becoming of age: he is not bound by the answer of his guardian
if he dissents in time. A re-conveyance ordered. Prntzman v. Pitesell, 3
H. & J. 77.

Ibid. sec. 97. 1888, art. 16. sec. 86. 1800. art. 16, sec. 73. 1778, ch. 22, sec. 2.
1818. ch. 193. sec. 8. 1819, ch. 183.

101. The court may, with the assent of the guardian of an infant,
or the trustee or committee of a person non compos mentis, and the con-
sent of the other persons of full age and sound mind, who may be inter-
ested, decree the sale of the real estate of such infant or person non
compos mentis, to save the personal.

Only those interested in both the real and personal property can institute
suit to have the real estate sold to save the personalty, and the creditors
must be protected. The suit must be treated as a creditor's suit. Waring
v. Waring, 2 Bl. 674.

Cited but not construed in Stein v. Stein, 80 Md. 309; Williams' Case. 3 Bl.
192.

Ibid. sec. 98. 1888, art. 16, sec. 87. 1860, art. 16, sec. 74. 1831, ch. 282, sees, 1, 2.

102. In any case where the surety of a sheriff, deputy sheriff or
collector of taxes shall apply to the court, by bill or petition, the court,
on being satisfied that such surety has suffered, or is likely to suffer loss
or damage by reason of his suretyship, may appoint a trustee to com-
plete his collections for the benefit of those concerned, and the court
shall compel such sheriff, deputy sheriff or collector, or his representa-
tives, to answer such bill or petition under oath, and disclose the state
of his collections.

This section is a duplicate of art. 90. sec. 9.