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ART. 16] DIVORCE. 357
of the execution of a deed of separation and continued life apart thereunder,
see Brown v. Brown, 5 Gill, 249; Brown v. Brown, 2 Md. Ch. 319.
For cases involving the proof of adultery, see Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 86
Md. 519; Kremelberg v. Kremelberg. 52 Md. 553.
For cases involving the portion of the act of 1872, ch. 272, providing that
the court might prohibit the guilty party from remarrying (repealed by the
act of 1888, ch. 486), see Dimpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 338; Garner v. Garner,
56 Md. 128: Elliott v. Elllott, 38 Md. 361.
See notes to sections 36 and 38.
1904, art. 16, sec. 37. 1SSS. art. 16. sec. 37. 1860. art. 16. sec. 26. 1841, ch. 262,
sec. 3. 1872. ch. 272.
38. Divorces a mensa et thoro may be decreed for the following
causes, to wit: first, cruelty of treatment; secondly, excessively vicious
conduct; thirdly, abandonment and desertion; and the court may decree
such divorces forever, or for a limited time; and in all cases where
divorce a mensa et thoro is decreed, it may be revoked at any time
thereafter by the court granting the same, upon the joint application
of the parties to be discharged from the operation of the decree; and
the court may decree a divorce a mensa et thoro in cases where a
divorce a vinculo matrimonii is prayed, if the causes proved be suffi-
cient to entitle the party to the same; and in all cases where a divorce
is decreed, the court passing the same shall have full power to award
to the wife such property or estate as she had when married, or the
value of the same, or of such part thereof as may have been sold or
converted by the husband, having regard to the circumstances of the
husband at the time of the divorce, or such part of any such property
as the court may deem reasonable; and shall also have power to order
and direct who shall hate the guardianship and custody of the children,
and be charged with their support and maintenance, and may at any
time thereafter annul, vary or modify such order in relation to the
children.
Cruelty of treatment; vicious conduct.
The term "excessively vicious conduct." defined Drunkenness as an inde-
pendent ground, does not justify a divorce. Shutt v. Shutt. 71 Md. 193;
Wheeler v. Wheeler. 101 Md. 432.
The term "cruelty of treatment." must be understood in a technical
sense. The causes must be grave and weighty, and such as show an absolute
impossibility that the duties of the married life can be discharged. Childs
v. Childs, 49 Md. 514. And see Hawkins v. Hawklns, 65 Md. 108,
Cruelty of treatment Justifying a divorce under this section, held to have
been proven. Sharp v. Sharp. 105 Md. 581; Freeny v. Preeny, 80 Md. 406:
Hawkins v. Hawkins. 65 Md. 108; Lynch v. Lynch, 33 Md. 331; Levering v.
Levering, 10 Md. 219; Tayman v. Tayman, 2 Md. Ch. 399; Ricketts v. Rlck-
etts. 4 Gill. 108. v. Goodhues v. Goodhues, 90 Md. 292; Shutt v. Shutt. 71
Md. 193; Hoshall v. Hoshall, 51 Md. 74: Coles v. Coles. 2 Md. Ch. 351;
Daiger v. Daiger. 2 Md. Ch. 339. And see Bowie v. Bowie. 3 Md. Ch. 54.
Property rights.
Where a wife during coverture voluntarily and without fraud or undue
influence, conveys her property to her husband or permits him to appropriate
it with her consent and without any promise to restore it. a divorce does not
vest her with an equitable title to such property. A decree of divorce has
no retroactive effect and does not restore the parties to their former condition.
Effect of a divorce upon property held as tenants by the entireties. Reed v.
Reed, 109 Md. 692; Tyson v. Tyson. 54 Md. 37.
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