354 CHANCERY. [ART. 10

This section applied as to subsequent creditors without notice. Cissel v.
Henderson. 88 Md. 570: Nally v. Long, 56 Md. 571: Hoffman v. Gosnell, 75
Md. 590; Dodge v. Stanhope, 55 Md. 115; Stanhope v. Dodge, 52 Md. 491;
Pfeaff v. Jones. 50 Md. 263; Dyson v. Simmons, 48 Md. 220; Sixth Ward
Bldg. Assn. v. Willson. 41 Md. 514; Pannell v. Farmers' Bank, 7 H. & J. 205;
Carroll v. Norwood, 1 H. & J. 167; Gill v. Griffith, 2 Md. Ch. 284; Brooks v.
Dent, 1 Md. Ch. 528; Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bl. 325.

A deed not recorded in time, ia not operative as to subsequent creditors
until recorded, but thereafter divests the powers of the grantor over the
property just as if it was recorded in time. Dodge v. Stanhope. 55 Md. 115.

The rule prescribed in this section will be applied where a mortgage
recorded in time, was defectively acknowledged. Purpose of this section.
Proof held not sufficient to charge subsequent creditors with actual notice.
Dyson v. Simmons. 48 Md. 218. Cf. Price v. McDonald, 1 Md. 403.

The effect of this section and of article 21, sections 1, 13, 19, 31 and 32,
is to protect the rights of subsequent creditors against a defective or unre-
corded mortgage, where the claims under said mortgage are asserted at
law. as well as in equity. Sixth Ward Bldg. Assn. v. Willson, 41 Md. 514.

The portion of this section giving subsequent purchasers without notice, a
priority over a mortgage recorded under this section, applied. Harding v.
Alien, 70 Md. 399; Sprigg, v. Lyles, 2 G. & J. 446. Cf. Price v. McDonald, 1
Md. 403.

The contention that a creditor of a mortgagor who knows of a prior unre-
corded mortgage, has a stronger equity than a subsequent creditor who has
no such knowledge, is in conflict with this section. Ohio Ins. Co. v. Ross. 2
Md. Ch. 33.

Application of this section.

This section has no application where the deed is recorded in time, and
the creditors seeking to charge the property are those of the grantee. Hart-
sock v. Russell. 52 Md. 626.

The application of this section to a deed of manumission, denied. Purpose
and intent of this section. Wicks v. Chew, 4 H. & J. 546; Miller v. Herbert.
5 How. 78.

Generally.

This section compared with article 21, section 19. This section refers
exclusively to deeds executed and acknowledged according to law and perfect
in all respects so far as the act of the grantor or mortgagor is concerned.
This section embraces mortgages. Requirements and provisos of this section.
Constructive notice. Pfeaff v. Jones, 50 Md. 263. And see Harding v. Alien.
70 Md. 399. Cf. Dyson v. Simmons, 48 Md. 218.

For a case dealing with the question of when a surety "trusts" his prin-
cipal, as Involved in the application of this section, see Nally v. Long, 56 Md.
571.

As against creditors and purchasers or assignees of a mortgagor who seeks to
redeem, the English doctrine of tacking or consolidation is inconsistent with
this section. Brown v. Stewart, 56 Md. 431.

This section referred to in passing upon the effect of a failure to stamp
a mortgage as required by an act of congress. Wingert v. Zelgler, 91 Md.
324.

An estate tail, held not to be embraced by. the act of 1785. ch. 72. section
11. Jones v. Jones, 2 H. & J. 284. And see Posey v. Budd, 21 Md. 482.

Cited but not construed in Woods v. Pulton. 4 H. & J. 331.

As to defective conveyances, see art. 21, sec. 82, et seq. See also, art. 21,
sec. 19.

1904, art. 16. sec. 34. 1888. art. 16, sec. 34. 1868, ch. 325.
35. Whenever any deed or bill of sale shall have been duly signed
and sealed by the parties thereto, but shall not have been acknowledged
by the said parties, or any one of them, in the manner or form, or before
the person authorized to take such act or acknowledgment, the circuit
court for the county in which, by law, the said deed or bill of sale