ART. 93] WILLS. 2151

unless the contrary intention shall appear in the will or codicil contain-
ing such devise or bequest.

This section applied. The appointee takes title directly from the donor
in the same manner as if the power and the instrument executing it had
been incorporated in one instrument. Prince de Bearn v. Winans, 111 Md.
469.

This section applies only to wills. How a power may be validly exercised.
Title upheld. Farlow v. Farlow, 83 Md. 122. And see Mines v. Gambrill, 71
Md. 35.

This section not relied upon because the will was a formal execution of
the power. Cherbonnier v. Bussey, 92 Md. 425.

This section has no retroactive effect; law prior thereto. Thorn v. Thorn,
101 Md. 452; Cooper v. Haines, 70 Md. 283; Balls v. Dampman. 69 Md. 393.

1904, art. 93, sec. 324. 1894, ch. 438, sec. 310 A.

331. Tn all wills hereafter executed, the real estate of every testator
not specifically devised shall be chargeable with the payment of pecuni-
ary legacies, wherever the personal estate after the payment of debts
shall prove to be insufficient, unless the contrary intention shall clearly
appear.

Under wills executed prior to the adoption of this section, the personal
estate is the primary fund for the payment of legacies, and they are never
charged upon real estate unless such an intention is manifest; such inten-
tion held not to be shown. Pearson v. Wartman, 80 Md. 531.

This section has no retroactive operation; law prior thereto. Ewell v.
McGregor. 90 Md. 359.

Ibid. sec. 325. 1888, art. 93, sec. 317. 1862. ch. 101.

332. Tn any devise or bequest of real or personal estate, the words

"die without issue," or "die without leaving issue," or any other words

which may import either a want or a failure of issue of any person

in his lifetime, or at the time of his death, or an indefinite failure of

his issue, shall be construed to mean a want or failure of issue in the

lifetime, or at the time of the death of such person, and not an indefinite

failure of his issue, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.

This section applied. The words "dies without bodily heirs" are embraced

within this section—these words construed. A will held not to show a

"contrary intention." Weybright v. Powell. 86 Md. 576; Combs v. Combs 07

Md. 16.

Except as to cases covered by this section, and unless there be words in
the will to explain and restrict the legal import of the words "dying without
heirs," etc., a limitation over on such contingency, is void. Gable v. Ellender,
53 Md. 315. And see Mason v. Johnson, 47 Md. 355; Woollen v Prick 38
Md. 437.

This section applied; object thereof. This section distinguished from a
similar English statute. Gambrill v. Forest Grove Lodge, 60 Md. 25 (cf.
the dissenting opinion in this case). Mason v. Johnson, 47 Md. 355.

This section applied. Hutchins v. Pearce. 80 Md. 445; Lednum v. Cecil, 76
Md. 153.

This section has no retroactive operation; law prior thereto. Benson v.
Linthicum, 75 Md. 144; Comegys v. Jones, 65 Md. 320; Dickson v. Satterfield,
53 Md. 322; James v. Rowland, 52 Md. 466; Estep v. Mackey, 52 Md. 596;
Woollen r. Frick, 38 Md. 437.

Prior to this section the rigidity with which the rule in Shelly's case was
applied elsewhere, had been relaxed somewhat in Maryland. Henderson v
Henderson. 64 Md. 191.

This section held to prevent an estate tail from arising by implication
Goldsborough v. Martin, 41 Md. 503.

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