ART. 93] WILLS. 2149

is not liable for his debts. Vogel v. Turnt, 110 Md. 199; Wallace v. DuBois,
65 Md. 161; Glenn v. Belt, 7 G. & J. 367.

The time of the transfer under this section is the death of the testator,
and those to whom the transfer is made are those in being entitled to the
distribution of the legatee's estate in case of intestacy. Hays v. Wright, 43
Md. 125; Glenn v. Belt, 7 G. & J. 367.

This section in connection with article 45, sec. 7, entitles a surviving
husband to dower in real estate devised to bis wife, where the wife dies
before the testator. Vogel v. Turnt, 110 Md. 201.

The terms "lapse" and "fail of taking effect", defined. Billingsley v.
Tongue, 9 Md. 581.

This section referred to in deciding that the lapsing of a bequest of corpo-
rate stock is governed by the lex domicilii. Lowndes v. Cooch, 87 Md. 485.

A legacy saved from lapsing under this section can not be bequeathed by
the legatee's will. Object of this section. The effect of a residuary bequest
by A. to B. where subsequently B. dies leaving all her property to A. Glenn
v. Belt. 7 G. & J. 365.

Estates tail general upon being converted into fee simple estates (under
article 46. section 1), are saved from lapse by this section; contra, as to
estates tail special. Pennington v. Pennington, 70 Md. 435,

Under the act of 1810, ch. 34, section 4, if the legacy is charged upon real
estate and the legatee dies after the testator but before the time of payment,
the legacy is lost. Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bl. 560.

Cited but not construed in Taylor v. Watson, 35 Md. 529; Darrington v.
Rogers. 1 Gill. 410.

As to the jurisdiction of equity over suits for legacies, see art. 16, sec. 97.

1904, art. 93. sec. 321. 1888, art. 93, sec. 314. 1860, art. 93, sec. 305.

1825, ch. 119.

327. In every will whereby any lands or real property shall be
devised to any person, and no words of perpetuity or limitation are used
in such devise, the devisee shall take under and by virtue of such devise
the entire and absolute estate and interest of the testator in such lands
or real property,, unless it shall appear, by devise over or by words of
limitation or otherwise, that the testator intended to devise a less estate
and interest.

Application of this section.

A contingent limitation over is not inconsistent with a devise of a fee
simple estate, and. therefore does not interfere with the application of this
section. Devecmon 1;. Shaw. 70 Md. 225; Gambrill v. Forest, etc., Lodge, 66
Md. 25; Estep v. Mackey, 52 Md. 599.

This section held not to apply because it did appear that the testator
intorded to devise a less estate, etc. Fairfax v. Brown, 60 Md. 55; Stone-
breaker v. Zollickoffer, 52 Md. 170; Hammond v. Hammond, 8 G. & J. 442;
Boyle v. Pnrker. 3 Md. Ch. 46.

This section does not apply where the devise is not of lands or real estate
but of their rents and profits, and where it appears that the testator intended
a less estate. Boyle v. Pnrker, 3 Md. Ch. 44.

Prior to the adoption of this section the law was to the contrary, and this
section has no retroactive effect. Preston v. Evans, 56 Md. 487; Moody v.
Elliott. 1 Md. Ch. 2P3; Pue v. Pue, 1 Md. Ch. 387.

This section applied. Whitley v. Jump, 94 Md. 189; Henderson v. Hender-
son, C4 Md. 192.

Generally.

This section apparently grew out of the opinion in Beall v. Holmes, 6 H. &
J. 208. This section reverses the rule that a life estate passed by a general
devise without words of limitation. Burden of proof. Backus v. Presby-
terian Assn . 77 Md. 59. And see Shreve v. Shreve, 43 Md. 402; Hammond v.
Hammond. 8 G. & J. 441.