2140 TESTAMENTARY LAW. [ART. 93

proved according to law; and I elect to take in lieu thereof my dower
or legal share of the estate of my said husband." But by renouncing
all claim to a devise or bequest, or devises or bequests of personal prop-
erty made to her by the will of her husband she shall be entitled to
one-third part of the personal estate of her husband which shall remain
after payment of his just claims against him, and no more.

Under this section the widow has six months from the grant of letters
after her husband's will is probated, within which to renounce. Renuncia-
tion held to have been made in time. Form of renunciation. Pindell v.
Pindell, 40 Md. 539.

The law admits of no excuse for the failure to renounce, which under this
section is a condition precedent to the wife's having dower. No one else can
renounce for the widow, and the fact that she is Insane, is immaterial. Col-
lins v. Carman, 5 Md. 530.

Where a widow renounces, she is entitled to her share of the personal
estate in kind under this section. In such cases she takes not under the
will but in opposition to it, and the property bequeathed her remains as if
no such bequest had been made. Effect of the renunciation upon other
bequests. Kuykendall v. Devecmon, 78 Md. 542; Hanson v. Worthington, 12
Md. 438; Barrington v. Rogers, 1 Gill, 410.

Under this section and section 317 where a husband renounces, the costs
of caveat proceedings should be borne by the estate passing under the will,
and the husband should not be charged with any part of it. Grabill
v. Plummer, 95 Md. 61.

This section applied. Gough v. Manning, 26 Md. 366; Durham v. Rhodes,
23 Md. 241.

If no provision for a widow is made by her husband's will, this section has
no application. Hokamp v. Hagaman, 36 Md. 518.

For a case involving a mutilated renunciation, and a certificate of the
register of wills as to the renunciation having been made, see Handy v. State.
7 H. & J. 46.

For a case involving the law relative to a renunciation prior to the adoption
of this section, see Griffith v. Griffith, 4 H. & McH. 101.

Cited but not construed in Ring v. Zimmerman, 94 Md. 16.

See notes to sec. 317.

1904, art. 93, sec. 299. 1888, art. 93, sec. 293. 1860, art 93, sec. 286. 179S,
ch. 101, sub-ch. 13. sec. 3.

303. If the will of the husband devise a part of both real and per-
sonal estate she shall renounce the whole, or be otherwise barred of her
right to both real and personal estate.

This section applied. Durham v. Rhodes, 23 Md. 242.
See notes to sec. 317.

Ibid. sec. 300. 1888, art. 93, sec. 294. 1860, art. 93, sec. 287. 1798, ch.
101, sub-ch. 13, sec. 4.

304. If the will devise only a part of the real estate, or only a part
of the personal estate, the devise shall bar her of only the real or per-
sonal estate, as the case may require; provided, nevertheless, that if the
devise of either real or personal estate, or both, shall be expressly in
lieu of her legal share of one or both, she shall accordingly be barred
unless she renounce as aforesaid.

This section applied. Durham v. Rhodes, 23 Md. 241. Thomas v. Wood, 1
Md. Ch. 300.

This section referred to in construing section 302—see notes thereto. Col-
lins v. Carman, 5 Md. 528.
See notes to sec. 317.