2032 TESTAMENTARY LAW. [ART. 93

The matter of granting letters to a person jointly with another under this
section, is within the discretion of the court and no appeal lies. When a
class of persons is first entitled, the one selected by the court as adminis-
trator is the person "first entitled" under this section. Kailer v. Kailer, 92
Md. 149. And see Covey v. Charles, 49 Md. 315.

The right of administration being a valuable one can not be delegated.
Slay v. Beck, 107 Md. 361; Brodie v. Mitchell, 85 Md. 519.

Cited but not construed in Georgetown College v. Browne, 34 Md. 455.

1904, art. 93. sec. 16. 1888, art 93, sec. 16. 1860, art. 93, sec. 16. 1798, ch. 101,

sub-ch. 5, sec. 3.

16. It shall be incumbent on the person applying for administra-
tion to prove such dying intestate to the satisfaction of the court, unless
the same be notorious; and the court may examine such person on
oath, touching the time, place and manner of the death, and whether
or not the party dying left any will; and if such dying intestate be not
proved to the satisfaction of the court, no administration shall be
granted. No such administration shall be granted until at least twenty
days after the death of the supposed intestate, and at least seven days
after application therefor.

The last sentence of this section applies only in case the Intestacy is not
notorious, or has not been proven to the satisfaction of the court. This sec-
tion construed to harmonize with section 14. Williams v. Addlson, 93 Md.
44; Jones v. Harbaugh. 93 Md. 273. Of. Stouffer v. Stouffer, 110 Md. 373.

The grant of letters is a judgment in rem, and does not prove intestacy
when a will is offered for probate. Letters may be revoked. Emmert v.
Stouffer, 64 Md. 551.

When letters granted in point of time as required by this section to a
stranger, will not be revoked. Carpenter v. Jones, 44 Md. 628.

It will be presumed that the orphans' court discharged its duty in inquir-
ing into the "time and place" of the death of the deceased; but be this as
it may, the matter can not be inquired into collaterally. Raborg v. Ham-
mond, 2 H. & G. 50.

This section referred to in construing section 14—see notes thereto. Grimes
v. Talbert, 14 Md. 172.

This section referred to in construing section 32—see notes thereto.
Ehlen v. Ehlen, 64 Md. 362.

This section referred to in a prosecution for perjury as showing that the
orphans' court has power to administer an oath. State v. Mercer, 101 Md.
540.

Cited but not construed in Georgetown College v. Browne. 34 Md. 455.

Ibid. sec. 17. 1888, art. 93, sec. 17. 1860, art. 93. sec. 17. 1798, ch. 101.

sub-ch. 5, sec. 7.

17. The qualifications of an administrator shall in all respects be
the same as herein prescribed for an executor, and all questions touch-
ing such qualifications shall be tried and determined by the same
proofs and in like manner.

This section referred to in deciding that the court would apply the same
rules in the matter of the time within which an application is made to re-
voke letters, as in an application for letters. Edwards v. Bruce, 8 Md. 396;
Cf. Stocksdale v. Conaway, 14 Md. 107.

Cited but not construed in Pollard v. Mohler. 55 Md. 289: Georgetown Col-
lege v. Browne, 34 Md. 455.
See notes to sec. 52.